Ijtihad as a Technical Term
There is no consensus of opinion among scholars belonging to different
Islamic schools regarding the literal meaning of the term ijtihad. A
section of Sunni `ulama' believes that ijtihad means making
effort and endeavour in order to achieve presumption (zann) regarding
a hukm(law) of the Shari'ah. The same definition is also found in
the writings of some Shi'i `ulama'. But this interpretation was first proposed
by a group of Sunni `ulama'. In any case, it would be appropriate to cite some
of the views held by Shi'i and the Sunni `ulama' in this regard:
(a) The great `Allamah Sayf al‑Din al‑'Amidi al‑Shafi`i
(d.631/1234) says: Ijtihad means putting in of effort and
endeavour in order to reach presumption (zann) regarding one
of the ahkam of the Shari'ah in such a manner that one feels
that he can do nothing more. [28]
(b) Al‑`Allamah Ibn Hajib Abu `Amr `Uthman ibn `Umar ibn Abi Baler
al‑Kurdi al‑Maliki (c. 570 ‑ 646/1174 ‑ 1248) writes in his Mukhtasar
al‑‘usul: Ijtihad means making effort to arrive at presumption
or conjecture regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah.
(c) Qadi `Abd al‑Rahman ibn Ahmad ibn `Abd al‑Ghaffar al‑Shafi`i
al-Adudi (d. 756/1355) , in his book Sharh Mukhtasar usul Ibn
Hajib,writes: Ijtihad is employing one's effort and
capacity in the way of arriving at a presumption regarding some hukm of
the Shari'ah.
(d) Abu Hamid Muhammad al‑Ghazali al‑Shafi`i (460‑505/10681111)
quotes the writer of Fawatih al‑rahamut to the effect
that: Ijtihad is the effort made on the part of the faqih to
derive a presumed hukm of the Shari`ah. [29]
(e) Muhammad Ma`ruf al‑Dawalibi writes: Ijtihad means
the exercise of ray which is not acceptable to all the
`ulama', for if it is accepted by all it would be called ijma` (consensus),
not ijtihad. Therefore, ijtihadis on a lower
standing than ijma’. [30]
(f) The great mujtahid al‑`Allamah al‑Hilli (648‑726/1250‑1325),
in his work al Nihayah on usul al‑fiqh, writes: Ijtihad means
employment of effort for arriving at presumption with regard to a hukm of
the Shari ah, in a way that is not blameworthy on account of negligence or
omission.
(g) Al‑`Allamah al Turayhi says: Ijtihad is to
employ one's effort and endeavour in pursuit of some difficult task and for
arriving at presumption with regard to a hukm of the Shari`ah. [31]
(h) The Usuli mujtahid al‑`Amili al‑Jiba`i
says: Ijtihad is the effort and endeavour of a faqih in order
to arrive at presumption in regard to ahukm of the Shari`ah. [32]
(i) Al‑Shaykh al‑Baha i in his Zubdah quotes al‑Hajibi
to the effect that: By ijtihad is meant the exhaustive
efforts of a faqih for arriving at presumption in regard to a hukm of
the Shari’ah. Al‑`Allamah al‑Hilli agrees with this definition in his
book Tahdhib al‑‘usul.
(j) Al `Allamah Taj al‑Din al‑Subuki, in his book Jam` al
jawami`,writes: Ijtihad as a technical term means the
utmost efforts made by a faqih for arriving at presumption in regard to a hukm (of
the Shari'ah).
The above‑mentioned definitions of ijtihad do not
appear to be correct; for if these are meant for determining the logical and
technical limits of ijtihad, these definitions fail to do so.
However, if only an explanation and clarification of the term ijtihad
is meant, they are not objectionable. Beyond that purpose, they have
no scientific value. Here we shall briefly point out the defects in the said
definitions.
According to the science of logic, a definition should be
inclusive of all the members of the set and exclude all alien elements; the
said definitions are not such. For , if by `presumption' (zann) they
mean something based on the Shari'ah or reason, they are not inclusive of all
their concerned instances. Because, an argument (dalil) related
to ahukm and derived from the Shari'ah or reason belongs to one of
the following three kinds:
1. The argument creates presumption.
2. The argument creates certainty.
3. The argument creates neither presumption nor certainty.
The said definitions deal with the first kind alone, and leave out
the two remaining kinds; whereas a definition of ijtihad should
include these two as well.
The exclusion of the second kind in the definitions cited ‑ that
is that the argument should create certainty ‑ is due to the fact that certainty
is different from presumption and the word `presumption' does not include it.
As to the exclusion of the third ‑ in which an argument does not produce either
presumption or certainty ‑ the reason is that the argument may not create
presumption. For instance, if the validity(hujjiyyah) of al‑shuhrat
al‑fatwa’iyyah or khabar al‑wahid oral‑'ijma` al‑manqul is
presupposed in such a way that despite not causing presumption they should
still be regarded as hujjah, then, according to this
hypothesis, the derivation of ahkam of the Shari'ah by means
of al-shuhrat al‑fatwa’iyyah, khabar al‑wahid andal‑ijma'al‑manqul would
not be ijtihad ‑ since we have supposed that they do not
create presumption ‑ and in the light of the said definitionsijtihad means
attainment of presumption.
If, in the above‑mentioned definitions, should `presumption' be
taken to include both trustworthy and untrustworthy presumptions ‑ as it
obviously does ‑ the definition will include untrustworthy presumption also,
while the attainment of presumption regarding a hukm of the
Shari’ah by means of untrustworthy presumptions is not considered asijtihad; because,
it is certain that unreliable presumption cannot be a source of legislation.
Accordingly, the definitions cited fail to exclude alien elements.
In addition they suffer from another fault ‑ especially those definitions
which mention the faqih ‑ as they fail to avoid a vicious circle.
In the definitions cited, the definition of `ijtihad' rests
upon the definition of `faqih' and vice versa, for `faqih', in
the technical sense, cannot be imagined without the technical qualification
defined as`ijtihad', and all scholars and thinkers unanimously
agree on the invalidity of the vicious circle.
Regarding this vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq al‑Qummi writes: The
faqih is a scholar who knows the Divine ahkam through the
means of reliable(mu'tabar) proofs (adillah) and
sources (manabi`). This ability does not materialize
without ijtihad, and without it no faqih can exist.
Accordingly, the definition of `faqih' rests upon defining ijtihad, and
vice versa.
Regarding the solution of the problem of the vicious circle, certain
Usulis have said: "According to these definitions, faqih is a person who
is acquainted with and is well‑versed in fiqh; as opposed to one who has no
knowledge of fiqh whatsoever. It does not mean someone who has the knowledge of
all the ahkam. It is clear that in this sense the meaning
of `faqih' does not rest on that of ijtihad; this
avoids the vicious circle, because whereas the definition of ijtihad
is dependent upon that of `faqih', the definition
of `faqih' is not dependent upon that ofijtihad ."
But al‑Muhaqqiq. al‑Qummi objects to this statement and says:
Firstly, such a sense imputed to `faqih' is figurative', as it
literally means one who knows all the ahkam, not one who knows
only a few of them or some of those things that are related to the ahkam. Secondly,
the effort made by one who is a `faqih' in this sense does not
give rise to the quality of ijtihad; for, one who knows the
outlines of the issues ofijtihad and has read a few books on
argumentative fiqh but lacks the faculty that enables him to revert the furu to
the usul, would not be considered a faqih.
Then, in an effort to remove the vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq al
Qummi says: The `faqih' is a person possessing such capacity
as would lead to the knowledge of far`i ahkam of the Shari'ah.
Thus, the definition ofijtihad is made dependent on that of the
faqih, whereas the vice versa is not essential. For, the knowledge of the ahkam of
the Shari'ah exists in a faqih as a (potential) capability, and in ijtihad it
exists as an actuality.
This view of the Muhaqqiq is objectionable, since faqih as
a term is applied to one who actually knows the far'i ahkam of
the Shari'ah through a command of its sources, not one who possesses merely the
faculty and capacity of doing so; as mere capacity and faculty do not qualify
one for this appallation, though the appallation of `mujtahid'may
fit him. Therefore, the vicious circle still remains; as it is quite clear that
the definition of `faqih' in the above sense is dependent upon
that of `ijtihad', and vice versa.
Moreover, the apparent meaning of this definition is unacceptable
not only in the Shi’i view of ijtihad but is also incomplete
and objectionable according to the Sunni viewpoint; because legal
grounds (adillah Shar’iyyah) are not confined to presumption
and conjecture alone according to Sunnis and include other things besides.
In any case, the definitions cited are too restrictive in some respects,
and in some others they do not exclude what is alien to ijtihad. Such
definitions are not sound according to the science of logic, and it may be
concluded that they are unacceptable to both the Muslim sects. Many a time such
incorrect definitions of ijtihad have been responsible for
giving rise to negative views about ijtihad, and made persons
like Mirza Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi, the founder of the Akhbari school, to
negate ijtihad outrightly. As a consequence of it ijtihad had
been declared as one of the innovations (bid`at) and
impermissible activities (this will be discussed in detail while dealing with
the Akhbari revolt against ijtihad).
In fact, if ijtihad means exactly what it has
been described to be in the definitions, its rejection is justified: for, to
claim something as a hukm of the Shari'ah on the basis of
presumptive and unreliable grounds (dala'il)and to act according to them
is not permissible in Islamic law. Verses of the Quran expressly forbid
reliance on presumption and conjecture. God Almighty has stated in the Quran:
O ye who believe, shun much suspicion (al‑zann) .... (49:12)
In another place He says:
Most of them follow naught but conjecture. Assuredly conjecture
can by no means take the place of the truth ....(10:36)
For positing a hukm of the Shari'ah only
certainty, or such argument or methods as have been validated by the Shari'ah,
may be relied upon. Such trustworthy grounds as khabar al‑wahid and
the Practical Principles (al‑'usul al‑`amaliyyah) of the
Shari'ah (Bara'ah, Ihtiyat,etc), though they do not lead to
certainty as to the real hukm (al‑hukm al‑waqi’i) ‑ for they
may be suspect regarding their chain of transmission, or meaning, or
authenticity of source ‑ but the certainty of their validity and reliability
justifies reliance upon them and action in accordance with them and provides
security from Divine chastisement.
Anyhow, the Usulis do not conceive ijtihad in the
above sense. Byijtihad' they mean the knowledge of the ahkam of
the Shari'ah from sources and grounds whose validity has been affirmed by the
Shari'ah, and it is by using such sources, principles and dicta that the mujtahid
isable to meet the needs of contingent issues and events of life.
Accordingly, the result of ijtihad in the context
of deduction of ahkamof the Shari'ah is to refer new furu` to the
fundamental usul (which are the general precepts of the Book and the Sunnah)
and to apply the usul to their corresponding instances. It is by means of ijtihad that
sufficient evidence or hujjah regarding a hukm of
the Shari'ah is secured for answers to emergent and contingent issues. Ijtihad is
not meant for providing presumption or conjecture. It is this sound meaning
of ijtihadthat the Usulis have accepted, and whosoever has faith
in Islam and believes in its eternal and immortal character is bound to accept
it in accordance with the precepts of the Shari'ah and the dictates of reason.
Because, it is not possible to posit the ahkam of the Shari`ah
for issues for which there is no specific express test without sufficient
evidence and valid grounds, and this is a conception which Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi
also accepts.
It is by means of such ijtihad that valid grounds
and basic and generalahkam are employed for deriving a hukm of
the Shari'ah on a contingent issue. Such ijtihad is approved
by the Akhbaris too, though they do not call it ijtihad'.
Thus, the incorrect conception of ijtihad ‑ i.e., the
attainment of presumption on a hukm of the Shari'ah ‑ which
incited the Akhbari opposition, is one which the Usuli also do not accept and
one which they have never approved of. The `presumption' which al‑`Allamah al-Hilli,
the author of Ma`alim al‑'asul, and some other Shi`i scholars
mention in their definitions of ijtihad, is not presumption in
its generalsense, but one which is trustworthy and supported by
some specificdalil..
Therefore, it does not include such presumption as is not
supported by a dalil; for such presumption has been forbidden
by verses of the Quran and ahadith. Hence, it cannot be said
that the `presumption' mentioned in the definitions includes this
(untrustworthy) kind of presumption. Accordingly, the ijtihad approved
by the Usulis means procurement of sufficient evidence (hujjah) regarding
a hukm of the Shari'ah ‑ a conception which the Akhbaris also
do not reject.
On this basis, it can be said that the dispute between the Usulis
and the Akhbaris is merely a verbal one, not one which is essential or
substantial, for both of them approve of securing sufficient evidence for
a hukm shar’i, with the difference that the Usulis call
it ijtihad whereas the Akhbaris do not name it so.
In reality, the only objection that theAkhbaris raise
regarding ijtihadrelates to the definition of ijtihad and
not to the Usulis or themujtahidun as such; for the Akhbaris
themselves never act on presumption unless it is validated by a reliable
Shar'i proof (dalil).
Thus, if the word `presumption' (zann) is
replaced with the term hujjah(evidence) in the said definition and
it is said: "Ijtihad means employment of one's powers to
secure sufficient evidence (hujjah) in regard to a hukm of
the Shari'ah", there is no doubt that this controversy can be completely
avoided and a synthesis of the views of the Akhbaris and the Usulis can be
achieved.
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