The dialog between Imam Shafi'i and his
interlocutor in the Risala is quite illuminating in this context.
633. He [i.e. the interlocutor] said: Is not an
opinion agreed upon in Madina stronger than a narrative related by an
individual? For why should he relate to us a weak narrative related by one
individual and refrain from relating to us a stronger and binding matter agreed
upon [among the scholars]?
634. [Shafi'i] asked: Supposing someone should
tell you: It is because the narrative is rare and the agreement [about the
matter] is too well known to be related; and should you yourself say: This is a
matter agreed upon?
635: He [the interlocutor] replied: Neither I
nor any of the scholars would say: 'This is [a matter] agreed upon,' unless it
were [a matter] about which you would never find a scholar who would not repeat
it to you and relate it from a predecessor, such as that the noon-prayer has
four [cycles, rak'as] and that wine is forbidden, and the like. I sometimes
find one who says: 'The matter is agreed upon,' but I often find scholars in Madina who say the
opposite, and I find that the majority [of scholars] of other cities oppose
what is said to be 'agreed upon.'[68]
It is reported that Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal,
founder of one of the four orthodox schools (madhab) made a general
assertion:
"Whoever claims consensus is a liar.”[69]
The argument of Imam Ibn Hanbal is that one may
claim there is no known case of disagreement or dissent, but a positive claim
of ijma (consensus) is simply not tenable without appropriate evidence.
Below is a summary of the various issues
pertaining to ijma (consensus) on which there is no ijma (consensus).
.
|
Subject
|
Is there an ijma?
|
.
|
.
|
.
|
1
|
Definition of ijma
|
No ijma on this
|
2
|
Whose agreement?
|
No ijma on this
|
3
|
What should be the competence of
the constituent members?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, Chap. V]
|
4
|
What period is covered by an ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, Chap. VI]
|
5
|
What is the scope of the
subject-matters of ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, Chap. VII]
|
6
|
Source of ijma's authority
(Qur'an, sunnah or ijma)?
|
No ijma on this
|
7
|
What is the meaning and scope of
Ummah or Jama'ah?
|
|
8
|
What is the meaning of dalal or khata as in the pertinent hadith that serves as basis for the
doctrine of ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, pp. 60-61; Kamali, p. 242]
|
9
|
Is the doctrine of ijma more justified by textual sources or rational reasons?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, pp. 61-63]
|
10
|
Was the selection of Hadrat Abu
Bakr as the Khalifa an ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, p. 78]
|
11
|
Are the matters of creeds/dogmas
within the scope of ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, p. 105]
|
12
|
Are worldly affairs covered by the
scope of ijma?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, p. 105]
|
13
|
Does ijma have to be on the basis of positive expression or can it
be by silence (of some)?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, Chap. VIII]
|
14
|
Once an ijma is reached, can it be modified or changed in future based
on new or further evidence?
|
No ijma on this
[Hasan, Chap. X]
|
Modern perspectives on ijma
The emergence of madhabs (schools of
jurisprudence) followed by the recognition of a few of these constituting
orthodoxy represents a systematization of both the methodology and corpus of
laws, codes and dogmas. The doctrine of ijma played a vital role in
this process. Diversity of thought and room for disagreement can represent
dynamism in certain respects. However, it was deemed desirable that broad
agreement or near-consensus should crystallize in each madhab concerning various aspects of worship and rituals. Clearly, this
does not mean that issues concerning whether tarawih prayer corresponds to 8
or 20 units, or whether amin should be said aloud in congregational prayer,
have been resolved across the madhabs even over the course of fifteen centuries.
Also, while the systematization of laws and codes have had an integrative
effect, it has also contributed toward rigidity and even intolerance at the
inter-madhab level. For example,
although according to the Hanafis, a marriage between a Hanafi male and a
Shafi’i female is valid according to the Shafi’i school it is invalid.[71] While ijma has been pivotal in enhancing integrative effects at the madhab level, with regards matters of rituals and worship the corpus of
Islamic laws and codes have become asynchronous not just with the contemporary
era, but also with the very principles and values of Islam that such laws and
codes are supposed to uphold.
That Muslims are not duty bound to be
permanently bound to former ijma is not a new or modern position. "This
principle has been propounded by the famous Hanafi jurist Abu al-Husr
al-Bazdawi in his book Usul al-Fiqh [Principles of Jurisprudence]. Al-Bazdawi
belongs to the fourth and fifth century of the Hijrah. This work is a great
contribution to Islamic jurisprudence. It is on account of his statement that
we can say that consensus cannot become a source of difficulty for us. If a
consensus is reached on some issue and it is found subsequently to be
unsuitable the possibility remains that we may change it through reasoning and
create a new one canceling the old consensus."[72]
Over recent centuries the classical definition
and treatment of ijma has been either rejected or challenged almost
consistently, with an effort to bring the doctrine into conformity with the
realities of the modern age and in accordance with the spirit and vision of
Islam. Muslim scholars and the intelligentsia in recent times have not
discarded the concept of ijma, but have instead sought to reinstitute it in a
practicable way. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1315 AH) "believed that ijma was
confused with custom by the masses who were following custom in the name of ijma."[73] He recognized the
validity of ijma if appropriately supported by textual evidence.
However, he also held that:
"the doctrine of ijma was a progressive concept. It should march with the time to solve
fresh problems. Hence sometimes he invalidated even the ijma of the Companions on a certain point contending that a fresh ijma
should be substituted for it in view of the change circumstances."[74]
Muhsin al-Mulk (d. 1325 AH) and Ubayd Allah
Sindhi (d. 1363 AH) are among those who have tried to redefine or reinterpret ijma.[75] Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1357
AH) is among those who have taken the modern discourse on ijma to a new height.[76]
“The revision of Islamic jurisprudence in the
light of modern situation prevailing in the Muslim world is the principal aim
of Iqbal. He thinks a deeper study of Islamic law will frustrate the advocates
of the view that Islamic law is stationary. The classical Fiqh of Islam
requires critical discussion, though this will offend most of the orthodox
Muslims. Fiqh should be changed in view of the change of circumstances. The
founders of Fiqh never claimed finality of their views. The fundamental legal
principles are to be interpreted in the light of the experience of modern
Muslim generation. ... He believes that the transfer of power of ijtihad to a
Muslim legislative assembly is the only possible form of ijma in modern times.
This will also secure contribution from laymen who possess insight into
affairs.”[77]
Among others of the reformist trend was Muhammad
Abduh (d. 1323 AH), former Rector of al-Azhar in Egypt. He also rejected the
commonly quoted hadiths forming the basis for determining the authoritative
position of ijma in Islamic jurisprudence.[78] He regarded the
classical definition of ijma as erroneous and impracticable, stating that:
He also emphasized the term Ulil amr (those in authority), suggesting that it was the men in authority
who should be elected by the people from the community themselves.[80] Al-Sanhuri too
emphasized the importance and relevance of ijma for the development of a
"representative government.”[81]
One of the primary impetuses behind challenging
and reinterpreting the doctrine of ijma in the reformist line is
the fact that:
“Ijma played a vital role in closing the gate of ijtihad. The agreed
decisions of the second and third centuries were irrevocable. Ijtihad was
exercised on points not yet settled by ijma. This continued in
every generation; the scholars of subsequent generations commented on or
explained the decisions of the early generations. Henceforth the gate of
ijtihad was closed, though some scholars at various times claimed to be
mujtahid. There is a certain analogy between the decisions taken on the basis
of ijma and those taken by the councils of Christian church. Ijma in Islam became the touchstone of heresy.”[82]
Ziauddin Sardar explains how the inclusive and
participatory dimension of ijma was lost and it became a tool for intolerance
and exclusivism.
“... the idea of ijma, the central notion of
communal life in Islam, has been reduced to the consensus of a select few. Ijma literally means consensus of the people. The concept dates back to
the practice of Prophet Muhammad himself as leader of the original polity of
Muslims. When the Prophet Muhammad wanted to reach a decision, he would call
the whole Muslim community – then, admittedly not very large – to the mosque. A
discussion would ensue; arguments for and against would be presented. Finally,
the entire gathering would reach a consensus. Thus, a democratic spirit was
central to communal and political life in early Islam. But over time the
clerics and religious scholars have removed the people from the equation – and
reduced ijma to ‘the consensus of the religious scholars’.
Not surprisingly, authoritarianism, theocracy and despotism reigns supreme in
the Muslim world. The political domain finds its model in what has become the
accepted practice and metier of the authoritatively ‘religious’ adepts, those
who claim the monopoly of exposition of Islam. Obscurantist Mullahs, in the
guise of the 'ulama, dominate Muslim societies and circumscribe them with
fanaticism and absurdly reductive logic.”[83]
The reformist tendency in regard to ijma and other aspects of Islamic jurisprudence is aptly summed up by
AbdulHamid AbuSulayman:
“The traditionalists consider ijma the consensus
of all Mujtahidin, which in the contemporary world boils down to
the consensus of the authoritative 'ulama'. This view is no longer
satisfactory. The ulama no longer necessarily represent the mainstream of
Muslim intellectual and public involvement. Their system of education does not
reflect the changes that are occurring in the world today. Their opinions
therefore often only add to the already existing confusion.
It is clear that the simple, traditional concept
of ijma is no longer suitable for a non-classical social system. Law and
policymaking, especially in the field of international relations, involve
complex techniques and considerations that are not susceptible to the old
application of ijma.
It is also clear that ijma on different subjects now requires the consensus of other segments
of society. The application of ijma can no longer be the exclusive prerogative of
the professional Ulama. Moreover, in a rapidly changing world, the concept of
permanent ijma, particularly as regards the fluid area of
international relations, is neither practical nor possible because of the
space-time factor.”[84]
Conclusion
Ijma has been presented as a source constituting final authority in
orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. Unfortunately, as discussed here, there are
serious problems concerning the functional use of this source. There is also no
agreed upon textual basis for the doctrine in question. Although ijma appears to have some redeeming features, this very much depends on
whether it can be made to regain its dynamism (in terms of the prerogative of
every generation to reach its own consensus) and to redefine its consultative-participatory
role (in terms of involvement of the pertinent scholars/experts or the entire
community through elected bodies).[85]
“Ijma is not a matter of consensus of a number of experts or jurists.
Its meaning and function should be worked out in relation to the legislative
function in concrete political systems, where it may produce a workable
relationship between the ideal and the real with maximum possible support and
participation on the part of Muslim peoples.”[86]
The goal of this work is not to assert that ijma has not played some vital role in the history of Islam. or that it
does not have any validity or relevance at all. Rather, it is to help drive
home the point that Muslims neither need nor should claim divine sanctity for a
concept that simply does not possess such agreed upon sanctity. Furthermore, as
explained here, there is hardly anything, except concerning a few broad and
basic matters, on which there is ijma or consensus. Thus,
Muslims need to be circumspect in accepting any claim about the validity of
having an ijma on something.
Acknowledging that cases where ijma
al-sahaba operate are rare and
that even the claims of such ijma are contested, if there is a legitimate ijma al-sahaba on an issue it needs to be accorded the highest regard. However,
the highest regard does not mean that any such claimed ijma is binding forever. Similarly, ijma of the scholars, jurists
and experts carries special weight in certain respects and must be accorded as
such. As long as ijma is not approached from the perspective of
infallibility, rather that it is approached from the viewpoint of
functionality, all such definitions of ijma can be valid and
relevant.
The scope of this article has been limited to
accommodate an exploration of how to ensure that ijma is relevant and
functional to any contemporary time. While there are serious gaps in the
doctrine of ijma, it is undeniable that there has to be some
integrative mechanisms, tools and institutions to bring functional and working
agreement and harmony among Muslims. In this regard, ijma as a classical Islamic doctrine may not be tenable, but the
concept definitely has relevance as a method and institution, which Muslims
must find ways to make practicable. Thus, conscientious Muslims need to
rededicate themselves to practicing Islam and living their lives according to a
dynamic, problem-solving way, instead of blindly adhering to rigid dogma or
self-indulgent legalism.
No comments:
Post a Comment