CHAPTER IV GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
76. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact
believing himself bound, by law:
Nothing is an offence which Is done by a person who is, or
who by reason of a mistake of fact and not reason of a mistake of law in good
faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
Illustrations
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his
superior officer, in conformity, with the commands of the law. A has committed
nooffence.
8 of 89(b) A an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered
by that Court to arrest Y and after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y arrests Z.
A has committed no offence.
77. Act of Judge when
acting judicially: Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting
judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he
believes to be, given to him by law.
78. Act done pursuant
to the judgment or order of Court: Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or
which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court of Justice, if done
whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding
the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided
the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such
jurisdiction.
79. Act done by a
person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law:
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or
who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in
good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the
exercise, to the best of his judgment, exerted in good faith of the power which
the law gives to all persons of apprehending murders in the act, seizes Z, in
order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A hascommitted no offence,
though it may turn out that Z was acting in self defence.
80. Accident in doing
a lawful act: Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune and
without any criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a
lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.
Illustration
A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a
man who is standing by. Here if there was no want of proper caution on the part
of A, his act is excusable and not an offence.
81. Act likely to
cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm:
Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge
that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention
to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding
other harm to person or property.
Explanation: It is a question of fact in such a case whether
the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to
justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was
likely to cause harm.
Illustrations
(a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without
any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that,
before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with
twenty or thirty passengers on board; unless he changes the course of his
vessel, and that, by changing his course, he must incur risk of running down a
boat C with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear Here, if
A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good
faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B,
he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C by doing an
act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter
of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him
incurring the risk of running down C.
(b) A, in a great
fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading.
He does this with the intention in good faith of saving human life or property.
Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so
imminent as to excuse A's act, A is not guilty of the offence.
82. Act of a child
under seven years of age: Nothing is an offence, which is done by a child under
seven years of age.
83. Act of a child
above seven and under twelve of immature understanding: Nothing is an offence
which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not
attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and
consequences of his conduct on that occasion.
84. Act of a person
of unsound mind: Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the
nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
85. Act of a person
incapable of Judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will:
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it,
is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or
that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the
thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or
against his will.
86. Offence requiring
a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated: In cases
where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or
intent, a person who dose the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to
be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had
not been intoxicated, unless 9 of 89intoxication shall be liable to be dealt
with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been
intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him
without his knowledge or against his will.
87. Act not intended
and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent:
Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and which is
not known by doer to be likely to cause death, or grievous hurt, is an offence
by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause,
to any person, above eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether
express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may
be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented
to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration A and Z agree to fence with each other for
amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which
in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while
playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence.
88. Act not intended
to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person's benefit: Nothing,
which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which
it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to
be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith,
and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm,
or to take the risk of that harm.
Illustration A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular
operation is likely to cause of death of Z, who suffers under the painful
complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death, and intending, in good faith
for Z's benefit, performs that operation on Z with Z's consent. A has-committed
no offence.
89. Act done In good
faith for benefit of child or insane person, by or by consent of guardian:
Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve
years of age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied,
of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an
offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to
cause or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to that person:
Provided
First: That this exception shall not extend to the
intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
Secondly: That this exception shall not extend to the doing
of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for
any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt; or the curing
of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Thirdly: That this exception shall not extend to the
voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous
hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the
curing of any grievous disease or infirmity;
Fourthly: That this exception shall not extend to the
abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration A, in good faith, for his child's benefit
without his child's consent, has his child cut for the stone by "a
surgeon, knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's
death, but not intending to cause the child's death. A is within the exception,
inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child.
90. Consent known to
be given under fear or misconception: A consent is not such a consent as is
intended by any action of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under
fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the
act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence
of such fear or misconception; or Consent of insane person: If the consent is
given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to
understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or
Consent of child: Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent
is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
91. Exclusion of acts
which are offences independently of harm caused: The exceptions in Sections 87,
88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm
which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to
cause, to the person giving the consent or on whose behalf the consent is
given.
Illustration Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good
faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman) to an offence
independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended, to cause to the
woman. Therefore it is not an offence by reason of such harm; and the consent
of the woman or of her guardian to the causing of such miscarriage does not
justify the act.
92. Act done in good
faith for benefit of a person without consent: Nothing an offence by reason of
any harm which it may cause to a person by whose benefit it is done in good
faith even without that person's consent, if the Circumstances are such that is
impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable
of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him
from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done
with benefit:
Provided
First: That this exception shall not extend to the
intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death;
Secondly: That this exception shall not extend to the doing
of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for
any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous, hurt, or the curing
of any grievous disease or infirmity;
10 of 89 or infirmity;
Thirdly: That this exception shall not extend to the
voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt for any purpose
other than the preventing of death or hurt;
Fourthly: That this exception shall not extend to the
abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not
extend.
Illustrations (a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is
insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned. A not
Intending Z's death but in good faith for Z's benefit, performs the trepan
before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence.
(b) Z is carried off
by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill
Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's benefit A's
ball gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
(c) A, a surgeon,
sees child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an
operation be immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child's
guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child,
intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. A has committed no offence.
(d) A is in a house
which is on fire with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the
child from the house-top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the
child, but not intending to kill the child and intending, in good faith, the
child's benefit. Here even, if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed
no offence.
Explanation: Mere
pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of Sections 88,89 and 92.
93. Communication
made in good faith: No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason
of any harm to the person to whom it is made for the benefit of that person.
Illustration A, a surgeon, in good-faith, communicates to a
patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the
shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the
communication might cause the patient's death.
94. Act to which a
person is compelled by threats: Except murder, and offences against the State
punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is
compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause
the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the
Consequence: Provided the person doing the act did not of
his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of
instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to
such constraint.
Explanation 1: A person who, of his own accord, or by reason
of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character,
is not entitled to the benefit of this exception on the ground" of his
having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by
law.
Explanation 2: A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and
forced by threat of instant death, to do a thing, which is an offence by law;
for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a
house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of
this exception.
95. Act causing
slight harm: Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is
intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that
harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of
such harm.
Of the right of
Private Defence
96. Things done in private defence:
Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the
right of private defence.
97. Right of private
defence of the body and of property: Every person has a right, subject to the
restrictions contained in Section 99, to defend;
First: His own body, and the body of any other person,
against any offence affecting the human body;
Secondly: The property, whether movable or immovable, of
himself or of any other person, against any act which is an offence falling under
the definition of theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an
attempt to commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
98. Right of private
defence against the act of a person of unsound mind, etc.: When an act, which
would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by reason of the
youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of mind or the
intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any misconception on
the part of that person, every person has the same right of private defence
against that act which he would have if the act were that offence.
Illustrations 11 of 89
Illustrations
(a) Z, under the influence of madness, attempts to kill A; Z
is guilty of no offence, but A has the same right of private defence which he would
have if Z were sane.
(b) A enters by night
a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z in good faith, taking A for a
house-breaker, attacks A. Here Z by attacking A under this misconception
commits no offence. But A has the same right of private defence against Z,
which he would have if Z were not acting under that misconception.
99. Act against which
there is no right of private defence: There is no right of private defence
against an act which dose not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of
grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done by a public servant acting in
good faith under colour, of his office, though that act may not be strictly
Justifiable by law. There is no right of private defence
against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of
grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office though that
directionmay not be strictly justifiable by law. There is no right of private
defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of
the public authorities.
Extent to which the right may be exercised: The right of
private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is
necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence.
Explanation 1 :A
person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or
attempted to be done, by a public servant, as such, unless he knows, or has
reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
Explanation 2: A person is not deprived of the right of
private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction
of a public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person
doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the
authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he
produces such authority, if deemed.
100. When the right
of private defence of the body extends to causing death: The right of private
defence of the body extends, under the restrictions mentioned in the last
preceding section, to the voluntary causing of death or of any other harm to
the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be of
any of the descriptions hereinafter enumerated, namely:--
First: Such an assault as may reasonably cause the
apprehension that death will otherwise be the consequence of such assault; Secondly:
Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous hurt
will otherwise be the consequence of such assault;
Thirdly: An assault with the intention of committing rape;
Fourthly: An assault with the intention of gratifying
unnatural lust.
Fifthly: An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abduction.
Sixthly: An assault with the intention of wrongfully
confining a person, under circumstances which may reasonably cause him to
apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for
his release.
101. When such right
extends to causing any harm other than death: If the offence be not of any of
the descriptions enumerated in the last preceding section, the right of private
defence of the body does not extend to the voluntary causing of death to the
assailant, but dose extend, under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99 to
the voluntary causing to the assailant of any harm other than death.
102. Commencement and
continuance of the right of private defence of the body: The right of private
defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to
the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the
offence may not have been committed; and it continues as long as such
apprehension of danger to the body continues.
103. When the right
of private defence of property extends to causing death: The right of private
defence of property extends, under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, to
the voluntary Causing of death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the
offence, the committing of which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions
the exercise of the right, be an offence of any of the descriptions hereinafter
enumerated, namely:-
First: Robbery;
Secondly: House-breaking by night;
Thirdly: Mischief by fire committed on any building, tent or
vessel, which building, tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling or as a place
for the custody of property;
Fourthly: Theft, mischief or house-trespass, under such
circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt
will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.
104. When such right
extends to causing any harm other than death: 12 of 89
104. When such right extends to causing any harm other than
death:
If the offence, the committing of which, or the attempting
to commit which, occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft,
mischief or criminal trespass, not of any of the descriptions enumerated in the
last preceding section that right does not extend, to the voluntary causing of
death, but dose extend, subject to the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, to
the voluntary causing to the wrong-doer of any harm other than death.
105. Commencement and
continuance of the right of private defence of property: The right of private
defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the
property commences. The right of private defence of property against theft
continues tilt the offender has affected his retreat with the property or
either the assistance of the public authorities is obtained, or the property
has been recovered. The right of private defence of property against robbery
Continues as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death
or hurt or wrongful restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or of
instant-hurt or of instant personal restraint continues. The right of private
defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief continues as long as
the offender continues in the commission of criminal trespass or mischief. The
right of private defence of property against house breaking by night continues
as long as the house-trespass which has been begun by such house-breaking
continues.
106. Right of private
defence against deadly assault when there is risk of harm to innocent person: If
in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which
reasonably causes the apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that
he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk of harm to an innocent
person, his right of private defence extends to the running of that risk.
Illustration A is attacked by a mob who attempt to murder
him. He cannot effectually exercise his right of private defence without firing
on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young children who are
mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so firing heharms any of the
children.
V OF ABETMENT
107. Abetment of a thing: A person abets the doing of a
thing, who:
First: Instigates any person to do that thing; or
Secondly: Engages with one or more other person or, persons
in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes
place in pursuance of that conspiracy, And in order to the doing of that thing;
or
Thirdly: Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1: A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or
by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose,
voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procures a thing to be
done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration A, a public officer, is authorized by a warrant
from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is
not Z, willfully presents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A
to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2: Whoever, either prior to or at the time of
commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of
that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the
doing of that act.
108. Abettor: A
person abets an offence, who abets either the commission of an offence, or the
commission of an act which would be an offence, if committed by a person
capable by law of committing an offence with the same Intention or knowledge as
that of the abettor.
Explanation 1: The abetment of the illegal omission-of an
act may amount to an offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do
that act.
Explanation 2: To constitute the offence of abetment it is
not necessary that the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect
requisite to constitute the offence should be caused.
Illustrations (a) A instigates 8 to murder C, B refuses to
do so. A is guilty of abetting B to commit murder.
(b) A instigates B to
murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D recovers from the wound.
A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder.
13 of 89 Explanation 3: It is not necessary that the person
abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should
have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor or any
guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustrations (a) A, with a guilty intention, abet a child
or a lunatic to commit an act which would be an offence, if committed by a
person capable by law of committing an offence, and having the same intention
as A. Here A whether the act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an
offence.
(b) A, with the
intention of murdering Z, instigates B, a child under seven years of age, to do
an act which causes Z's death. B, in consequence of the abetment, does the act
in the absence of A and thereby, cause Z's death. Here, though B was not
capable by law of committing an offence, A is liable to be punished in the same
manner as if B had been capable by law of committing ah offence, and had
committed murder, and he is therefore subject to the punishment of death.
(c) A instigates B to
set fire to a dwelling-house, B, in consequence of the unsoundness of his mind,
being incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is
wrong or contrary to law, sets fire to the house in consequence of As
instigation. B has committed no offence, but A is guilty, of abetting the
offence of setting fire to a dwelling house, and is liable to the punishment provided
for that offence.
(d) A intending to
cause a theft to be committed instigates B to take property belonging to Z out
of Z's possession. A includes B to believe that the property belongs to A. B
takes the property out of Z's possession in good faith, believing it to be A's
property. B, acting under this misconception, does not take dishonestly, and
therefore does not commit theft. But is guilty of abetting theft, and is liable
to the same punishment as if B had committed theft.
Explanation 4: The
abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of such an abetment is
also an offence.
Illustration A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z. B
accordingly instigates C to murder Z, and commits that offence in consequence
of B's instigation. B is liable to be punished for his offence with the
punishment for murder; and as A instigated B to commit the offence, A is
Also liable to the same punishment. Explanation 5: It is not
necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment by conspiracy that the
abettor should concert the offence with the person who commits it. It is
sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which the offence is
committed.
Illustration A concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is
agreed that A shall administer the poison. B then explains the plan to C
mentioning that athird person to administer the poison, but without mentioning
A's name. C agrees to procure the poison and procures and delivers it to B for
the purpose of its being used in the manner explained. A administer the poison;
Z dies in consequence. Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C
has been engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C
has, therefore, committed the offence defined in this section and is liable to
the punishment for murder. 25[
108-A Abetment in Pakistan of offences outside it: A person
abets an offence within the meaning of this Code who, in Pakistan, abets the
commission of any act without and beyond Pakistan which would constitute an
offence committed in Pakistan.
Illustration A, in Pakistan, instigates B, a foreigner in
Goa, to commit a murder in Goa, A is guilty of abetting murder.
109. Punishment of
abetment if the Act abetted committed In consequence and where no express
provision is made for its punishment:
Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this
Code, for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with the punishment
provided for the offence:
26[ Provided that,
except in case of Ikrah-i-Tam, the, abettor of an offence referred to in
Chapter XVI shall be liable to punishment of ta'zir specified for such offence
including death.] 26 Explanation: An act or offence is said-to be committed in
consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of the
instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which
constitutes the abetment.
Illustrations 14 of 89
Illustrations (a) A offer a bribe to B, a public servant, as
a reward for showing A some favor in the exercise of B's official functions. B
accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence defined in Section 161.
(b) A instigates B to
give false evidence. B, in consequence of the instigation commits that offence.
A is guilty of abetting that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as
B.
(c) A and B conspire
to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers
it to B in order that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the
conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A's absence and thereby causes Z's
death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is guilty, of abetting that offence by
conspiracy, and is liable to the punishment for murder.
110. Punishment of
abetment if person abetted does act with different intention from that of
abettor: Whoever abets the commission of an offence shall, if the person
abetted does the act with a different intention or knowledge from that of the
abettor, be punished with the punishment provided for the offence which would
have been committed if the act had been done with intention or knowledge of the
abettor and with no other.
111. Liability of
abettor when one act abetted and different act done: When an act is abetted and
a different act is done, the abettor is liable for the act done, in the same
manner and to the same extent as if he had directly, abetted it:
Provided the act done was a probable consequence of the
abetment; and was committed under the influence of the instigation, or with the
aid or in pursuance of the conspiracy which constituted the abetment.
An illustration (a) A instigates a child to put poison into
the food of Z, and gives him poison for that purpose. The child, in consequence
of the instigation, by mistake puts the poison into the food of Y, which is by
the side of that of Z. Here if the child was acting under the influence of A's
instigation, and the act done was under the circumstances a probable consequence
of the abetment, A is liable in the same manner and to the same extent as if he
had instigated the child to put the poison into the food of.
(b) A instigates B to
burn Z's house. B sets fire to the house and at the same time commits theft of
property there. A, though guilty of abetting the burning of the house, is not
guilty of abetting the theft; for the theft was a distinct act, and not a
probable consequence of the burning.
(c) A instigates B
and C to break into an inhabited house at midnight for the purpose of robbery
and provides them with arms for that purpose, B and C break into the house, and
being resisted by Z, one of the inmates, murder Z. Here, if that murder was the
probable consequence of the abetment. A is liable to the punishment provided
for murder.
112. Abettor when
liable to cumulative punishment for act abetted and for act done: If the act
for which the abettor is liable under the last preceding section is committed
in addition to the act abetted, and constitutes a distinct offence, the abettor
is liable to punishment for each of the offences.
Illustration A instigates B to resist by force a distress
made by a public servant, B in consequence resists that distress. In offering
the resistance, B voluntarily causes grievous hurt to the officer executing the
distress. As B has committed both the offence of resisting the distress, and the
offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, B is liable to punishment for
both these offences; and: if A knew that B was likely voluntarily to cause grievous
hurt in resisting the distress A will also be liable to punishment for each of
the offences.
113. Liability of
abettor for an effect caused by the act abetted different from that intended by
the abettor:
When an act is abetted with the intention on the part of the
abettor of causing a particular effect and an act for which the abettor is
liable in consequence of the abetment, causes a different effect from that
intended by the abettor, the abettor is liable for the effect caused, in the
same manner and to the same extent as if he had abetted the act with the
intention of causing that effect, provided he knew that the act abetted was
likely to cause that effect.
Illustration A instigates B to cause grievous hurt to Z B,
In consequence of the instigation, causes grievous hurt to Z. Z dies in
consequence. Here, if A knew that the grievous hurt abetted was likely to cause
death; A is liable to be punished with the punishment provided for murder.
114. Abettor present
when offence is committed: Whenever any person, who if absent would be liable
to be punished as an abettor, is present when the act or offence for which he
would be punishable in consequence of the abetment is committed, he shall be
deemed to have committed such act or offence.
115. Abetment of
offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life if offence not
committed: Whoever abets the commission of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, shall, if that offence be not committed in consequence
of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code for the
punishment of such abetment be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. If
act causing harm be done in consequence: And if any act for which the abettor
is liable in consequence of the abetment, and which cause hurt to any person,
is done, the abettor shall be liable to imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to fourteen years, and shall also be liable to fine. 15
of 89
Illustration A
instigates B to murder Z. The offence is not committed. If B had murdered Z, he
would have been subject to the punishment of death or transportation for fife.
Therefore A is labile to imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven
years and also to a fine; and if any hurt be done to Z in consequence of the
abetment, he will be liable to imprisonment for a term which may extend to
fourteen years, and to fine.
116. Abetment of
offence punishable with imprisonment-if offence be not committed: Whoever abets
an offence punishable with imprisonment shall, if that offence be not committed
in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is made by this Code
for the punishment of such abetment, be punished with imprisonment of any
description provided for that offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth
part of the. Longest term provided for that offence; or with such fine as is provided
for that offence; or with both. If abettor or person abetted be a public
servant whose duty it is to prevent offence:
And if the abettor or the person abetted is a public
servant, whose duty it is, to prevent the commission of such offence, the
abettor shall be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for
that offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the longest term
provided for that offence, or withsuch fine as is provided for the offence, or
with both.
Illustrations (a) A
offer a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for showing A some favor in
the exercise of B's official functions. B refuses to accept the bribe. A is
punishable under this section.
(b) A instigates B to
give false evidence. Here, if B does not give false evidence A has nevertheless
committed the offence defined in this section, and is punishable accordingly.
(c) A, police
officer, whose duty it is. To prevent robbery, abets the commission of robbery.
Here, though the robbery be not committed, A is liable to one-half of the
longest term of imprisonment proved for that offence, and also to fine.
(d) B abets the
commission of a robbery by H, a police officer, whose duty it is to prevent
that offence. Here though the robbery be not committed, B is liable to one-half
of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence of robbery, and
also to fine.
117. Abetting
commission of offence by the public or by more than ten persons: Whoever abets
the commission of an offence by the public generally or by any number or class
of persons exceeding ten, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with
both.
Illustration A affixes in a public place a placard
instigating a sect consisting of more than ten members to meet at a certain
time and place, for the purpose of attacking the members of an adverse sect,
while engaged in a procession. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
118. Concealing
design to commit offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life if
offence be committed:
Whoever intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely
that he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment of life, voluntarily conceals by any act or illegal omission,
the existence of design to commit such offence or makes any representation
which he knows to be false respecting such design, if offence be not committed,
shall, if that offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, or, if the offence be not
committed, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to three years; and in either case shall also be liable to fine.
Illustration A, knowing that dacoity is about to be
committed at B, falsely inform the Magistrate that a dacoity is about to be
committed at C, a place in an opposite direction, and thereby misleads the
Magistrate with intent to facilitate the commission of the offence. The dacoity
is committed at B in pursuance of the design. A is punishable under this
section.
119. Public servant
concealing design to commit offence which it is his duty to prevent: Whoever,
being a public servant intending to facilitate or knowing it to be likely that
he will thereby facilitate the commission of an offence which it is his duty as
such public servant to prevent, voluntarily conceals, by any act or illegal
omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence, or makes any
representation which he knows to be false respecting such design, if offence be
committed: shall, if the offence be committed, be punished with imprisonment of
any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one
half of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with such fine as is provided
for that offence, or with both; if offence be punishable with death, etc: or if
the offence be punishable with death or imprisonment for life with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years; if offence be
not
committed: or, if the offence be not committed, shall be punished
with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence for a term which
may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of such imprisonment or with
such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustration A, an officer of police, being legally bound to
give information of all design as to commit robbery, which may come to his
knowledge, and knowing that B designs to commit robbery, omits to give such
information, with intent to facilitate the commission of that of that 16 of 89 and
knowing that B designs to commit robbery, omits to give such information, with
intent to facilitate the commission of that of that offence. Here A has by an
illegal omission concealed the existence of B's design, and is liable to
punishment according to the provisions of this section.
120. Concealing
design to commit offence punishable with imprisonment: Whoever, intending to
facilitate or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby facilitate the
commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment, voluntarily conceals, by
any act or illegal omission, the existence of a design to commit such offence,
or makes any representation which he knows to be false respecting such design, if
offence be committed; if offence be not committed: shall, if the offence be
committed, be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence,
for a term which may extend to one-fourth, and, if the offence be not
committed, to one-eighth, of the longest term of such imprisonment, or with
such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.
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