The
justice system and the constitution
The United Kingdom has three separate legal
systems; one each for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
The United Kingdom has three separate legal
systems; one each for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. This
reflects its historical origins and the fact that both Scotland and Ireland,
and later Northern Ireland, retained their own legal systems and traditions
under the Acts of Union 1707 and 1800. This website deals with the judiciary of
England and Wales. We mention briefly the Tribunals Service, which extends to
Scotland, and the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which has jurisdiction over
the entire United Kingdom since it replaced the Judicial Committee of the House
of Lords in October 2009.
You can find more information about the other
jurisdictions in the United Kingdom in the navigation on the right.
The justice system is one of the three branches
of the state. The other two branches are the executive, or the government, and
the legislature, which is the two Houses of Parliament. In most democracies
these three branches of the state are separate from each other. They have roles
and functions that are defined within written constitutions, preventing the
concentration of power in any one branch and enabling each branch to serve as a
check on the other two branches. This is known as separation of powers. The
United Kingdom, famously and almost uniquely, does not have a constitution that
is contained in a written constitutional instrument. Its constitution is to be
found in the statutes passed by Parliament and in the common law, the law
developed over the centuries in the decisions of the courts. Only two other
countries, Israel and New Zealand, are like the United Kingdom in not having a
written constitutional instrument. These three countries differ in this way
from almost all other countries. Such constitutional instruments, for instance
that of the United States, which has one of the most well known written
constitutions, often have a higher status than ordinary legislation and
constitutional provisions can only be enacted and repealed by a special
procedure that differs from the procedure for making and repealing ordinary
legislation.
Our lack of a written constitution is one of the
consequences of the way the United Kingdom and its political and legal
institutions have evolved since 1066. Another consequence is that our
institutions did not separate the functions and powers of the three different
branches of the state, the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. For
example, the government (or executive) is made up of MPs and peers who are also
members of the legislature (the House of Commons and the House of Lords). In
the United States by contrast, the President and members of the Cabinet, (the
executive), are entirely separate from the legislature, (the Senate and the
House of Representatives). Historically, there are many other examples of this
mixing of roles in the United Kingdom. For example, until the end of the 19th
Century judges could be elected as MPs, and in some rare cases, judges such as
the Lord Chief Justice, would serve as members of the Cabinet, and thus be members
of the government. This has happened only once in the last 100 years when Lord
Reading, appointed Lord Chief Justice in 1913, served in numerous executive
positions, including as High Commissioner to Washington in 1917. Notably, until
October 2009 our highest court was a committee of the House of Lords. Although
since the last quarter of the nineteenth century only judges appointed as Lords
of Appeal in Ordinary (“Law Lords”) and other peers who have held high judicial
office have been able to take part in the work of the Committee, Law Lords
continued to contribute to debates, in particular on proposals for legislation
about the courts and the administration of justice.
The overlap between the judicial branch of the
state with the other branches was for the most part brought to an end in the
19th Century. There was, however, one significant exception to this: the office
of Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor’s office is one of the oldest in the
United Kingdom, originating according to some in Anglo-Saxon times, but with a
formal history beginning in 1068 after the Norman Conquest. Over the centuries
many famous figures have served as Lord Chancellor. They include; Thomas á
Becket, Cardinal Wolsey, Thomas More and Francis Bacon. The Lord Chancellor’s
office was the clearest example of how the British constitution did not
separate and indeed mixed the three branches of the state. The Lord Chancellor
was a senior Cabinet minister and therefore a member of the executive, a judge
and the head of the judiciary of England and Wales, and a member of the
legislature, indeed the person who presided over the deliberations of the House
of Lords, in effect its Speaker. The one office involved and combined all three
branches of government. This might have been acceptable when the office came
into existence. Its continued existence in that form had however been
questioned on a number of occasions in the last two hundred years. Most
famously, it was criticised by Walter Bagehot in The English Constitution
(1867) in the following terms:
“The whole office of the Lord Chancellor is a
heap of anomalies. He is a judge, and it is contrary to obvious principle that
any part of administration should be entrusted to a judge; it is of very grave
moment that the administration of justice should be kept clear of any sinister
temptations. Yet the Lord Chancellor, our chief judge, sits in the Cabinet, and
makes party speeches in the Lords.”
Such concerns continued to be raised during the
20th Century. Although since the 1960s the Lord Chancellor sat as a judge less
frequently, he continued to appoint judges. Moreover, the administrative
responsibilities of the office for the court system increased significantly as
a result of the reforms introduced by the Courts Act 1971 which transferred responsibility
for many courts from cities and local authorities to central government and the
Lord Chancellor. The concerns were finally addressed in 2003 when the
government proposed the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor. The result
of this clearer appreciation of the principles of the separation of powers in
relation to judicial functions was, however, not abolition of the office but
reform. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 brought about a significant change
in the nature of the office, essentially removing the Lord Chancellor’s
position as a judge and head of the judiciary of England and Wales, and
position as the Speaker of the House of Lords. The Lord Chancellor is now a
Secretary of State and, like other Cabinet ministers, also a member of the
legislature.
As part of the process which led to the
Constitutional Reform Act, in January 2004 the Government and the judiciary
entered into a “Concordat”. One essential purpose of this was to guarantee the
continued independence of the judiciary. The Concordat also sets out which of
the functions hitherto exercised by the Lord Chancellor were “judicial” and now
the province of the judiciary, which were “administrative”, and remain the
province of government, and which are “hybrid” and should be shared.
The 2005 Act did more than simply reform the
office of Lord Chancellor. It made reference to two of the fundamental
principles of our constitution, the rule of law and the independence of the
judiciary. While the judiciary’s independence has long been an issue that has
been referred to in statute, such as the Bill of Rights 1689 or the Act of
Settlement 1701, this was the first time that the rule of law was specifically
referred to in statute. Common understandings had grown up over the centuries
about what these entailed, but in the light of the other changes made it was
considered important for the Act to refer to them and thus to give them
statutory force. Details of the key changes brought in by the Act include:
·
An explicit statutory
duty on government ministers to uphold the independence of the judiciary.
Ministers are specifically barred from trying to influence judicial decisions
through any special access to judges. The Lord Chancellor also has a specific
statutory duty to defend the judiciary’s independence. For example, this duty
requires the Lord Chancellor to defend members of the judiciary carrying out
their judicial functions from adverse comment by other members of the
government. The starkest example of this arose as a consequence of the Sweeny
case in June 2006. Craig Sweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment. The
sentencing judge was required to set a minimum period of imprisonment before
which the Parole Board could not consider his release on licence and, in
accordance with statutory provisions and the sentencing guidelines the judge
set a minimum period of five years and 108 days. Both the Home Secretary and a
junior minister in the Department of Constitutional Affairs, criticised this.
The DCA minister went so far as to say on Radio 4 that the sentence was wrong,
although she later withdrew her comments. The Lord Chancellor spoke out against
both his governmental colleagues and publicly defended the sentencing judge .
In doing so he acted consistently with the duty imposed on the Lord Chancellor
to defend the judiciary;
·
The transfer of the Lord
Chancellor’s judicial functions to the Lord Chief Justice who became the
President of the Courts of England and Wales. As a consequence of this transfer
of responsibility the Lord Chief Justice gained responsibility for the
training, guidance and deployment of Judges. He or she also has the
responsibility for representing the views of the judiciary of England and Wales
to Parliament and ministers;
·
The creation of a United
Kingdom Supreme Court which is separate from and independent of the House of
Lords. The new court has its own independent appointments system, staff,
budget, and building in the former Middlesex Guildhall, opposite the Houses of
Parliament;
·
The establishment of an
independent Judicial Appointments Commission. The Commission has the effective
responsibility for selecting judges, although formally the Commission makes
recommendations to the Lord Chancellor. This seeks to ensure that, while merit
remains the sole criterion for appointment, the appointments system is more
open and transparent;
·
The establishment of the
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, responsible for investigating and
making recommendations concerning complaints about the judicial appointments
process, and the handling of complaints about judicial conduct.
The changes to the constitutional position since
2003 have also had important practical consequences. These relate to the
day-to-day leadership of the judiciary, the way judges are appointed and the
way in which complaints are dealt with. These changes have helped to clarify
the independence of the judiciary and are designed to enhance accountability,
public confidence and the effectiveness of the work of the judiciary. The creation
of a Ministry of Justice in 2007 which brought together responsibility for
criminal justice, prisons, and penal policy (previously the Home Secretary’s
responsibility) and responsibility for the courts service and legal aid
(previously the Lord Chancellor’s responsibility) led to a further agreement
between government and the judiciary in January 2008. This recognises that the
judiciary has a distinct responsibility to deliver justice independently.
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