al-fiqh, a number of legal encyclopedias have emerged in recent decades in Egypt and elsewhere,
usually bearing the title al-Mawsu'ah al-Fiqhiyyah' with the express purpose of offering a balanced
treatment of the views and contributions of all the prominent schools of law. As a result, the relatively
stronger orientation toward particular schools that is noticeable in the earlier works on usul al-fiqh,
especially those that were authored after the crystallisation of the madhahib, is not a prominent feature
of the modern works. A more open attitude has in fact emerged which seeks to move away from the
sectarian bias that can be found in some earlier works, and it is no longer unusual for a Sunni scholar to
write on Shi’i thought, scholars and institutions, with a view to highlighting their contributions to
Islamic law and jurisprudence. The present writer welcomes this development, but if his own work fails
to offer adequate coverage of the doctrines of the various schools, it is due solely to considerations of
brevity and space which may be expected of a handbook of this size.
III. It is perhaps true to say that Islamic jurisprudence exhibits greater stability and continuity of values,
thought and institutions when compared to Western jurisprudence. This could perhaps be partially
explained by reference to the respective sources of law in the two legal systems. Whereas rationality,
custom, judicial precedent, morality and religion constitute the basic sources of Western law, the last
two acquire greater prominence in Islamic Law. The values that must be upheld and defended by law
and society in Islam are not always validated on rationalist grounds alone. Notwithstanding the fact that
human reason always played an important role in the development of Shari'ah through the medium of
ijtihad, the Shari’ah itself is primarily founded in divine revelation.
A certain measure of fluidity and overlap with other disciplines such as philosophy and sociology is
perhaps true of both Islamic and Western jurisprudence. But it is the latter which exhibits the greater
measure of uncertainty over its scope and content. Thus according to one observer, books that bear the
title 'jurisprudence' vary widely in subject matter and treatment, because the nature of the subject is
such that no distinction of its scope and content can be clearly determined,
[Dias, Jurisprudence, p. I.] and in Julius Stone's somewhat dramatic phrase, jurisprudence is described as 'a chaos of approaches to achaos of topics, chaotically delimited'.
[See this and other statements by Bentham, Dicey and Arnold in Curzon, Jurisprudence, p. 13.]
Usul al-fiqh, on the other hand, has a fairly well defined structure, and the ulema had little difficulty in
treating it as a separate discipline of Islamic learning. Textbooks on usul al-fiqh almost invariably deal
with a range of familiar topics and their contents are on the whole fairly predictable. This is perhaps
reflective of the relative stability that the Shari’ah in general and the usul al-fiqh in particular has
exhibited through its history of development, almost independently of government and its legislative
organs. This factor has, however, also meant that usul al-fiqh has for the most part been developed by
individual jurists who exerted themselves in their private capacity away from the government
machinery and involvement in the development of juristic thought. Consequently, usul al-fiqh has to
some extent remained a theoretical discipline and has not been internalised by the legislative machinery
of government. The history of Islamic jurisprudence is marred by a polarisation of interests and values
between the government and the ulema. The ulema's disaffection with the government did not
encourage the latter's participation and involvement in the development of juristic thought and
institutions, and this has to some extent discouraged flexibility and pragmatism in Islamic
jurisprudence. Note, for example, the doctrinal requirements of ijma', especially the universal consensus
of the entire body of the mujtahidun of the Muslim community that is required for its conclusion, a
condition which does not concede to considerations of feasibility and convenience. There is also no
recognition whatsoever of any role for the government in the doctrine of ijma' as a whole. The
government for its part also did not encourage the ulema's involvement and participation in its
hierarchy, and isolated itself from the currents of juristic thought and the scholastic expositions of the
ulema. The schools of jurisprudence continued to grow, and succeeded in generating a body of doctrine,
which, however valuable, was by itself not enough to harness the widening gap between the theory and
practice of law in government. One might, for example, know about qiyas and maslahah, etc., and the
conditions which must be fulfilled for their valid operation. But the benefit of having such knowledge
would be severely limited if neither the jurist nor the judge had a recognised role or power to apply it.
One might add here also the point that no quick solutions are expected to the problem over the
application of the Shari’ah in modern jurisdictions. The issue is a long- standing one and is likely to
continue over a period of time. It would appear that a combination of factors would need to be
simultaneously at work to facilitate the necessary solutions to the problem under discussion. One such
factor is the realisation of a degree of consensus and cooperation between the various sectors of society,
including the ulema and the government, and the willingness of the latter, to take the necessary steps to
bring internal harmony to its laws. To merge and to unify the Shari’ah and modern law into an organic
unity would hopefully mean that the duality and the internal tension between the two divergent systems
of law could gradually be minimised and removed.
Bearing in mind the myriad and rapidly increasing influences to which modern society is exposed, the
possibility of consensus over values becomes ever more difficult to obtain. To come to grips with the
fluctuation of attitude and outlook on basic values that the law must seek to uphold has perhaps become
the most challenging task of the science of jurisprudence in general. To provide a set of criteria with
which to determine the propriety or otherwise of law and of effective government under the rule of law,
is the primary concern of jurisprudence.
The Muslim jurist is being criticised for having lost contact with the changing conditions of
contemporary life in that he has been unable to relate the resources of Shari’ah to modern government
processes in the fields of legislation and judicial practice. A part of the same criticism is also leveled
against the government in Islamic countries in that it has failed to internalise the usul al-fiqh in its
legislative practices. The alleged closure of the door of ijtihad is one of the factors which is held
accountable for the gap that has developed between the law and its sources on the one hand and the
changing conditions of society on the other. The introduction of statutory legislation which has already
become a common practice in Islamic countries has also affected the role and function of ijtihad. Apart
from circumventing the traditional role of the jurist/mujtahid, the self-contained statutory code and the
formal procedures that are laid down for its ratification have eroded the incentive to his effective
participation in legislative construction. Furthermore, the wholesale importation of foreign legal
concepts and institutions to Islamic countries and the uneasy combinations that this has brought about
in legal education and judicial practice are among the sources of general discontent. These and many
other factors are in turn accountable for the Islamic revivalism/resurgence which many Muslim
societies are currently experiencing.
In view of the diverse influences and the rapid pace of social change visible in modern society it is
perhaps inevitable to encounter a measure of uncertainty in identifying the correct balance of values.
But the quest to minimise this uncertainty must remain the central concern of the science of
jurisprudence. The quest for better solutions and more refined alternatives lies at the very heart of
ijtihad, which must, according to the classical formulations of usul al-fiqh, never be allowed to
discontinue. For ijtihad is wajib kafa’i, a collective obligation of the Muslim community and its
scholars to exert themselves in order to find solutions to new problems and to provide the necessary
guidance in matters of law and religion. But even so, to make an error in ijtihad is not only tolerated but
is worthy of reward given the sincerity and earnestness of the mujtahid who attempts it. And it is often
through such errors that the best solution can ultimately be reached. One can have different solutions to
a particular problem, and sometimes the best solution may be known and yet unattainable given the
feasibility and practical considerations that might limit one's range of choice. In such situations one
must surely do that which is possible under the circumstances. But it is imperative not to abandon
ijtihad completely. It is a common and grave error to say that ijtihad is unattainable and that the
conditions for its exercise are too exacting to fulfill. To regulate ijtihad is indeed the primary objective
of usul al-fiqh and of whatever it has to teach regarding the sources of law and the methods of
interpretation and deduction. A grasp of the concepts and doctrines of usul al-fiqh is not only helpful
but necessary to ijtihad so as to enable the Muslim jurist and legislator to contribute to the on-going
search for better solutions to social issues, and hopefully also toward the development of the outlook
that the Shari’ah, despite its restraints, also possesses considerable flexibility and resources to
accommodate social change.
IV. With regard to the translation of technical Arabic terms, I have to some extent followed the existing
works, especially Abdur Rahim's Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. But in the absence of any
precedent, or when I was able to find a better alternative, I have improvised the equivalent English
terms myself. Most of the Arabic terms are easily convertible into English without engaging in
technicalities, but there are occasions where this is not the case, and at times the choice of terms is
determined on grounds of consistency and style rather than semantic accuracy. To give an example, one
of the chapters in this book is devoted to the discussion of textual implications (al-dalalat). The five
varieties of textual implications, namely 'ibarah al-nass, isharah al-nass, dalalah al-nass, iqtida al-nass
and mafhum al-mukhalafah, each signify a different concept for which an exact English equivalent is difficult to find. I have always tried to give priority to semantic accuracy, but as can be seen this is not
the only factor which has determined my choice of 'explicit meaning', 'alluded meaning', 'implied
meaning', 'required meaning' and 'divergent meaning' for the foregoing terms respectively. For at times
like this, it becomes difficult to be semantically exact as the shades of meaning and concepts tend to be
somewhat overlapping. A measure of technicality and arbitrariness in the choice of terms is perhaps
inevitable in dealing with certain topics of usul al-fiqh such as the classification of words and the rules
of interpretation. On such occasions, I thought it helpful not to isolate the English terms from their
Arabic originals. I have therefore repeated the Arabic terms frequently enough to relate them to their
English equivalents in the text. But when the reader is not sure of the meaning of technical terms a look
at the glossary, which appears at the end of the text might prove useful.
The translation of the Qur'anic passages which occur in the text is generally based on Abdullah Yusuf
Ali's translation of the Holy Qur'an. On occasion, however, I have substituted elements in this
translation for easier and more simplified alternatives. But whenever I have done so, it is usually the
result of my having checked more than one translation. The reader will also notice that I have not given
the original of the Qur’anic passages in Arabic, as this is not difficult to find. Besides, the Qur’anic text
is uniform and there is no variation in the wording of its text in all of its numerous printings that are
commonly used. But when it comes to the Hadith, although the main authorities on Hadith are inclined
to maintain consistency in both the concept and wording of the Hadith, it is nevertheless not unusual to
come across inconsistency or variation in the exact wording of a particular Hadith in various sources.
Partly for this reason, but also for the sake of accuracy and convenience, I have given both the Arabic
original and the English translation of the Hadith on first occurrence in the text. The English rendering
of the Hadith consists for the most part of my own translation of the Arabic original, otherwise I have
used the English translation as and when it was available.
A word may also be in order here regarding the English rendering of the terms fiqh and usul al-fiqh.
The difference between them is fairly obvious in their respective Arabic usages: usul al-fiqh is
unequivocal in its reference to the 'roots of fiqh'. This is, however, not so clear in the equivalent English
terms, which are currently in use. The terms 'Muhammadan Law' and 'Islamic Law' have often been
used in a generic sense and applied both to fiqh and usul al-fiqh. The same is true of its familiar
alternative, 'Islamic jurisprudence'. None of these convey the clarity, which is found in their Arabic
equivalents. There are, for example, books currently available in English bearing one or the other of the
these titles, although their contents do not seek to distinguish the two disciplines from one another.
The term 'Muhammadan Law' seems to be already falling out of use, and it has almost become an
established practice to reserve 'Islamic Law' for fiqh, and 'Islamic jurisprudence' for usul al-fiqh. This
use of terminology should be retained. A similar distinction between the term’s 'source' and 'proof'
would seem advisable. The former should, as far as possible, be reserved for the Qur’an and Sunnah,
and the latter for other proofs.My transliteration of Arabic words is essentially the same as that of the Encyclopedia of Islam (New
Edition), with two exceptions, which have become standard practice: q for k and j for dj.
And finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank most warmly my colleagues and students at
the Faculty of Law, International Islamic University, with whom I have frequently raised and discussed
matters of mutual interest. I have often benefited from their views, which I have taken into account in
writing the present work. I would also like to thank the secretarial staff of the faculty for their unfailing
willingness to type for me whenever I have approached them. And last but not least, I wish to thank the
library staff of the I.I.U. for their assistance, and for being courteous and helpful.
V. Since the publication of the first edition of this book in April 1989, the comments, observations and
responses that I have received from scholars, students, and readers have been very positive and
encouraging. The changes that I have carried out for the present edition of the book relate to both its
content and format, although the overall approach to these changes was to leave the bulk of the original
work intact. The changes that I have made are on the whole confined to particular parts and they do not
entail a recomposition of the original text. I have thus added fresh information and elaborated parts of
the chapters on abrogation (naskh), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and presumption of continuity
(istishab). The new information either consists of the elaboration of concepts or insertion of additional
illustrations for purposes of clarity and relevance to contemporary concerns over the themes of Islamic
jurisprudence. The addition to the chapter on naskh thus reflects the results of a discussion over a paper
entitled 'The Nature, Sources and Objective of the Shari’ah' which I presented to a symposium
organised by the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur in September 1989. The additions to
some of the other chapters consist mainly of fresh research and expert opinion on the potential
contribution of some of the neglected principles of usul al-fiqh such as istishab to modern
jurisprudence. I have also refined minor portions of the text in the interest of clarity and precision.
As for the changes of format these were carried out as a result of my consultation with the editorial staff
of the Islamic Texts Society, particularly Mohsen al-Najjar and T. J. Winter. It was thus agreed at the
outset to re-set the whole of the original text so as to implement the standard practice of the Islamic
Texts Society concerning transliteration, footnotes and minor editorial changes in the text. It is thus
hoped that these changes have assured the production of a smoother and more familiar text for its
readers in Europe and America.
Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, Professor Emeritus and Dean of the Faculty of Law, International Islamic
University, Malaysia, has contributed a new Foreword for the second edition. He was kind enough to do
so despite his numerous other commitments, and preoccupation with his own writings. I take this
opportunity to thank him most warmly for his valuable contribution, and the fact that he wrote a
Foreword to both the first and the present editions of my book. He has taken a keen interest in my
usually bearing the title al-Mawsu'ah al-Fiqhiyyah' with the express purpose of offering a balanced
treatment of the views and contributions of all the prominent schools of law. As a result, the relatively
stronger orientation toward particular schools that is noticeable in the earlier works on usul al-fiqh,
especially those that were authored after the crystallisation of the madhahib, is not a prominent feature
of the modern works. A more open attitude has in fact emerged which seeks to move away from the
sectarian bias that can be found in some earlier works, and it is no longer unusual for a Sunni scholar to
write on Shi’i thought, scholars and institutions, with a view to highlighting their contributions to
Islamic law and jurisprudence. The present writer welcomes this development, but if his own work fails
to offer adequate coverage of the doctrines of the various schools, it is due solely to considerations of
brevity and space which may be expected of a handbook of this size.
III. It is perhaps true to say that Islamic jurisprudence exhibits greater stability and continuity of values,
thought and institutions when compared to Western jurisprudence. This could perhaps be partially
explained by reference to the respective sources of law in the two legal systems. Whereas rationality,
custom, judicial precedent, morality and religion constitute the basic sources of Western law, the last
two acquire greater prominence in Islamic Law. The values that must be upheld and defended by law
and society in Islam are not always validated on rationalist grounds alone. Notwithstanding the fact that
human reason always played an important role in the development of Shari'ah through the medium of
ijtihad, the Shari’ah itself is primarily founded in divine revelation.
A certain measure of fluidity and overlap with other disciplines such as philosophy and sociology is
perhaps true of both Islamic and Western jurisprudence. But it is the latter which exhibits the greater
measure of uncertainty over its scope and content. Thus according to one observer, books that bear the
title 'jurisprudence' vary widely in subject matter and treatment, because the nature of the subject is
such that no distinction of its scope and content can be clearly determined,
[Dias, Jurisprudence, p. I.] and in Julius Stone's somewhat dramatic phrase, jurisprudence is described as 'a chaos of approaches to achaos of topics, chaotically delimited'.
[See this and other statements by Bentham, Dicey and Arnold in Curzon, Jurisprudence, p. 13.]
Usul al-fiqh, on the other hand, has a fairly well defined structure, and the ulema had little difficulty in
treating it as a separate discipline of Islamic learning. Textbooks on usul al-fiqh almost invariably deal
with a range of familiar topics and their contents are on the whole fairly predictable. This is perhaps
reflective of the relative stability that the Shari’ah in general and the usul al-fiqh in particular has
exhibited through its history of development, almost independently of government and its legislative
organs. This factor has, however, also meant that usul al-fiqh has for the most part been developed by
individual jurists who exerted themselves in their private capacity away from the government
machinery and involvement in the development of juristic thought. Consequently, usul al-fiqh has to
some extent remained a theoretical discipline and has not been internalised by the legislative machinery
of government. The history of Islamic jurisprudence is marred by a polarisation of interests and values
between the government and the ulema. The ulema's disaffection with the government did not
encourage the latter's participation and involvement in the development of juristic thought and
institutions, and this has to some extent discouraged flexibility and pragmatism in Islamic
jurisprudence. Note, for example, the doctrinal requirements of ijma', especially the universal consensus
of the entire body of the mujtahidun of the Muslim community that is required for its conclusion, a
condition which does not concede to considerations of feasibility and convenience. There is also no
recognition whatsoever of any role for the government in the doctrine of ijma' as a whole. The
government for its part also did not encourage the ulema's involvement and participation in its
hierarchy, and isolated itself from the currents of juristic thought and the scholastic expositions of the
ulema. The schools of jurisprudence continued to grow, and succeeded in generating a body of doctrine,
which, however valuable, was by itself not enough to harness the widening gap between the theory and
practice of law in government. One might, for example, know about qiyas and maslahah, etc., and the
conditions which must be fulfilled for their valid operation. But the benefit of having such knowledge
would be severely limited if neither the jurist nor the judge had a recognised role or power to apply it.
One might add here also the point that no quick solutions are expected to the problem over the
application of the Shari’ah in modern jurisdictions. The issue is a long- standing one and is likely to
continue over a period of time. It would appear that a combination of factors would need to be
simultaneously at work to facilitate the necessary solutions to the problem under discussion. One such
factor is the realisation of a degree of consensus and cooperation between the various sectors of society,
including the ulema and the government, and the willingness of the latter, to take the necessary steps to
bring internal harmony to its laws. To merge and to unify the Shari’ah and modern law into an organic
unity would hopefully mean that the duality and the internal tension between the two divergent systems
of law could gradually be minimised and removed.
Bearing in mind the myriad and rapidly increasing influences to which modern society is exposed, the
possibility of consensus over values becomes ever more difficult to obtain. To come to grips with the
fluctuation of attitude and outlook on basic values that the law must seek to uphold has perhaps become
the most challenging task of the science of jurisprudence in general. To provide a set of criteria with
which to determine the propriety or otherwise of law and of effective government under the rule of law,
is the primary concern of jurisprudence.
The Muslim jurist is being criticised for having lost contact with the changing conditions of
contemporary life in that he has been unable to relate the resources of Shari’ah to modern government
processes in the fields of legislation and judicial practice. A part of the same criticism is also leveled
against the government in Islamic countries in that it has failed to internalise the usul al-fiqh in its
legislative practices. The alleged closure of the door of ijtihad is one of the factors which is held
accountable for the gap that has developed between the law and its sources on the one hand and the
changing conditions of society on the other. The introduction of statutory legislation which has already
become a common practice in Islamic countries has also affected the role and function of ijtihad. Apart
from circumventing the traditional role of the jurist/mujtahid, the self-contained statutory code and the
formal procedures that are laid down for its ratification have eroded the incentive to his effective
participation in legislative construction. Furthermore, the wholesale importation of foreign legal
concepts and institutions to Islamic countries and the uneasy combinations that this has brought about
in legal education and judicial practice are among the sources of general discontent. These and many
other factors are in turn accountable for the Islamic revivalism/resurgence which many Muslim
societies are currently experiencing.
In view of the diverse influences and the rapid pace of social change visible in modern society it is
perhaps inevitable to encounter a measure of uncertainty in identifying the correct balance of values.
But the quest to minimise this uncertainty must remain the central concern of the science of
jurisprudence. The quest for better solutions and more refined alternatives lies at the very heart of
ijtihad, which must, according to the classical formulations of usul al-fiqh, never be allowed to
discontinue. For ijtihad is wajib kafa’i, a collective obligation of the Muslim community and its
scholars to exert themselves in order to find solutions to new problems and to provide the necessary
guidance in matters of law and religion. But even so, to make an error in ijtihad is not only tolerated but
is worthy of reward given the sincerity and earnestness of the mujtahid who attempts it. And it is often
through such errors that the best solution can ultimately be reached. One can have different solutions to
a particular problem, and sometimes the best solution may be known and yet unattainable given the
feasibility and practical considerations that might limit one's range of choice. In such situations one
must surely do that which is possible under the circumstances. But it is imperative not to abandon
ijtihad completely. It is a common and grave error to say that ijtihad is unattainable and that the
conditions for its exercise are too exacting to fulfill. To regulate ijtihad is indeed the primary objective
of usul al-fiqh and of whatever it has to teach regarding the sources of law and the methods of
interpretation and deduction. A grasp of the concepts and doctrines of usul al-fiqh is not only helpful
but necessary to ijtihad so as to enable the Muslim jurist and legislator to contribute to the on-going
search for better solutions to social issues, and hopefully also toward the development of the outlook
that the Shari’ah, despite its restraints, also possesses considerable flexibility and resources to
accommodate social change.
IV. With regard to the translation of technical Arabic terms, I have to some extent followed the existing
works, especially Abdur Rahim's Principles of Muhammadan Jurisprudence. But in the absence of any
precedent, or when I was able to find a better alternative, I have improvised the equivalent English
terms myself. Most of the Arabic terms are easily convertible into English without engaging in
technicalities, but there are occasions where this is not the case, and at times the choice of terms is
determined on grounds of consistency and style rather than semantic accuracy. To give an example, one
of the chapters in this book is devoted to the discussion of textual implications (al-dalalat). The five
varieties of textual implications, namely 'ibarah al-nass, isharah al-nass, dalalah al-nass, iqtida al-nass
and mafhum al-mukhalafah, each signify a different concept for which an exact English equivalent is difficult to find. I have always tried to give priority to semantic accuracy, but as can be seen this is not
the only factor which has determined my choice of 'explicit meaning', 'alluded meaning', 'implied
meaning', 'required meaning' and 'divergent meaning' for the foregoing terms respectively. For at times
like this, it becomes difficult to be semantically exact as the shades of meaning and concepts tend to be
somewhat overlapping. A measure of technicality and arbitrariness in the choice of terms is perhaps
inevitable in dealing with certain topics of usul al-fiqh such as the classification of words and the rules
of interpretation. On such occasions, I thought it helpful not to isolate the English terms from their
Arabic originals. I have therefore repeated the Arabic terms frequently enough to relate them to their
English equivalents in the text. But when the reader is not sure of the meaning of technical terms a look
at the glossary, which appears at the end of the text might prove useful.
The translation of the Qur'anic passages which occur in the text is generally based on Abdullah Yusuf
Ali's translation of the Holy Qur'an. On occasion, however, I have substituted elements in this
translation for easier and more simplified alternatives. But whenever I have done so, it is usually the
result of my having checked more than one translation. The reader will also notice that I have not given
the original of the Qur’anic passages in Arabic, as this is not difficult to find. Besides, the Qur’anic text
is uniform and there is no variation in the wording of its text in all of its numerous printings that are
commonly used. But when it comes to the Hadith, although the main authorities on Hadith are inclined
to maintain consistency in both the concept and wording of the Hadith, it is nevertheless not unusual to
come across inconsistency or variation in the exact wording of a particular Hadith in various sources.
Partly for this reason, but also for the sake of accuracy and convenience, I have given both the Arabic
original and the English translation of the Hadith on first occurrence in the text. The English rendering
of the Hadith consists for the most part of my own translation of the Arabic original, otherwise I have
used the English translation as and when it was available.
A word may also be in order here regarding the English rendering of the terms fiqh and usul al-fiqh.
The difference between them is fairly obvious in their respective Arabic usages: usul al-fiqh is
unequivocal in its reference to the 'roots of fiqh'. This is, however, not so clear in the equivalent English
terms, which are currently in use. The terms 'Muhammadan Law' and 'Islamic Law' have often been
used in a generic sense and applied both to fiqh and usul al-fiqh. The same is true of its familiar
alternative, 'Islamic jurisprudence'. None of these convey the clarity, which is found in their Arabic
equivalents. There are, for example, books currently available in English bearing one or the other of the
these titles, although their contents do not seek to distinguish the two disciplines from one another.
The term 'Muhammadan Law' seems to be already falling out of use, and it has almost become an
established practice to reserve 'Islamic Law' for fiqh, and 'Islamic jurisprudence' for usul al-fiqh. This
use of terminology should be retained. A similar distinction between the term’s 'source' and 'proof'
would seem advisable. The former should, as far as possible, be reserved for the Qur’an and Sunnah,
and the latter for other proofs.My transliteration of Arabic words is essentially the same as that of the Encyclopedia of Islam (New
Edition), with two exceptions, which have become standard practice: q for k and j for dj.
And finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank most warmly my colleagues and students at
the Faculty of Law, International Islamic University, with whom I have frequently raised and discussed
matters of mutual interest. I have often benefited from their views, which I have taken into account in
writing the present work. I would also like to thank the secretarial staff of the faculty for their unfailing
willingness to type for me whenever I have approached them. And last but not least, I wish to thank the
library staff of the I.I.U. for their assistance, and for being courteous and helpful.
V. Since the publication of the first edition of this book in April 1989, the comments, observations and
responses that I have received from scholars, students, and readers have been very positive and
encouraging. The changes that I have carried out for the present edition of the book relate to both its
content and format, although the overall approach to these changes was to leave the bulk of the original
work intact. The changes that I have made are on the whole confined to particular parts and they do not
entail a recomposition of the original text. I have thus added fresh information and elaborated parts of
the chapters on abrogation (naskh), analogical reasoning (qiyas), and presumption of continuity
(istishab). The new information either consists of the elaboration of concepts or insertion of additional
illustrations for purposes of clarity and relevance to contemporary concerns over the themes of Islamic
jurisprudence. The addition to the chapter on naskh thus reflects the results of a discussion over a paper
entitled 'The Nature, Sources and Objective of the Shari’ah' which I presented to a symposium
organised by the International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur in September 1989. The additions to
some of the other chapters consist mainly of fresh research and expert opinion on the potential
contribution of some of the neglected principles of usul al-fiqh such as istishab to modern
jurisprudence. I have also refined minor portions of the text in the interest of clarity and precision.
As for the changes of format these were carried out as a result of my consultation with the editorial staff
of the Islamic Texts Society, particularly Mohsen al-Najjar and T. J. Winter. It was thus agreed at the
outset to re-set the whole of the original text so as to implement the standard practice of the Islamic
Texts Society concerning transliteration, footnotes and minor editorial changes in the text. It is thus
hoped that these changes have assured the production of a smoother and more familiar text for its
readers in Europe and America.
Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, Professor Emeritus and Dean of the Faculty of Law, International Islamic
University, Malaysia, has contributed a new Foreword for the second edition. He was kind enough to do
so despite his numerous other commitments, and preoccupation with his own writings. I take this
opportunity to thank him most warmly for his valuable contribution, and the fact that he wrote a
Foreword to both the first and the present editions of my book. He has taken a keen interest in my
