Friday, October 25, 2013

al-tawhid ,ijtihad Ijtihad as a Technical Term

Ijtihad as a Technical Term

There is no consensus of opinion among scholars belonging to dif­ferent Islamic schools regarding the literal meaning of the term ijtihad. A section of Sunni `ulama' believes that ijtihad means making effort and endeavour in order to achieve presumption (zann) regarding a hukm(law) of the Shari'ah. The same definition is also found in the writings of some Shi'i `ulama'. But this interpretation was first proposed by a group of Sunni `ulama'. In any case, it would be appropriate to cite some of the views held by Shi'i and the Sunni `ulama' in this regard:

(a) The great `Allamah Sayf al‑Din al‑'Amidi al‑Shafi`i (d.631/1234) says: Ijtihad means putting in of effort and endeavour in order to reach presumption (zann) regarding one of the ahkam of the Shari'ah in such a manner that one feels that he can do nothing more. [28]

(b) Al‑`Allamah Ibn Hajib Abu `Amr `Uthman ibn `Umar ibn Abi Baler al‑Kurdi al‑Maliki (c. 570 ‑ 646/1174 ‑ 1248) writes in his Mukhtasar al‑‘usul: Ijtihad means making effort to arrive at presump­tion or conjecture regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah.

(c) Qadi `Abd al‑Rahman ibn Ahmad ibn `Abd al‑Ghaffar al‑Shafi`i al-Adudi (d. 756/1355) , in his book Sharh Mukhtasar usul Ibn Hajib,writes: Ijtihad is employing one's effort and capacity in the way of arriving at a presumption regarding some hukm of the Shari'ah.

(d) Abu Hamid Muhammad al‑Ghazali al‑Shafi`i (460‑505/1068­1111) quotes the writer of Fawatih al‑rahamut to the effect that: Ijtihad is the effort made on the part of the faqih to derive a presumed hukm of the Shari`ah. [29]

(e) Muhammad Ma`ruf al‑Dawalibi writes: Ijtihad means the exer­cise of ray which is not acceptable to all the `ulama', for if it is accept­ed by all it would be called ijma` (consensus), not ijtihad. Therefore, ijtihadis on a lower standing than ijma’[30]

(f) The great mujtahid al‑`Allamah al‑Hilli (648‑726/1250‑1325), in his work al Nihayah on usul al‑fiqh, writes: Ijtihad means employ­ment of effort for arriving at presumption with regard to a hukm of the Shari ah, in a way that is not blameworthy on account of negligence or omission.

(g) Al‑`Allamah al Turayhi says: Ijtihad is to employ one's effort and endeavour in pursuit of some difficult task and for arriving at pre­sumption with regard to a hukm of the Shari`ah. [31]

(h) The Usuli mujtahid al‑`Amili al‑Jiba`i says: Ijtihad is the effort and endeavour of a faqih in order to arrive at presumption in regard to ahukm of the Shari`ah. [32]

(i) Al‑Shaykh al‑Baha i in his Zubdah quotes al‑Hajibi to the ef­fect that: By ijtihad is meant the exhaustive efforts of a faqih for ar­riving at presumption in regard to a hukm of the Shari’ah. Al‑`Allamah al‑Hilli agrees with this definition in his book Tahdhib al‑‘usul.

(j) Al `Allamah Taj al‑Din al‑Subuki, in his book Jam` al jawami`,writes: Ijtihad as a technical term means the utmost efforts made by a faqih for arriving at presumption in regard to a hukm (of the Shari'ah).

Critique of the Above Definitions

The above‑mentioned definitions of ijtihad do not appear to be correct; for if these are meant for determining the logical and technical limits of ijtihad, these definitions fail to do so. However, if only an ex­planation and clarification of the term ijtihad is meant, they are not objectionable. Beyond that purpose, they have no scientific value. Here we shall briefly point out the defects in the said definitions.

According to the science of logic, a definition should be inclusive of all the members of the set and exclude all alien elements; the said definitions are not such. For , if by `presumption' (zann) they mean something based on the Shari'ah or reason, they are not inclusive of all their concerned instances. Because, an argument (dalil) related to ahukm and derived from the Shari'ah or reason belongs to one of the following three kinds:

1. The argument creates presumption.

2. The argument creates certainty.

3. The argument creates neither presumption nor certainty.

The said definitions deal with the first kind alone, and leave out the two remaining kinds; whereas a definition of ijtihad should include these two as well.

The exclusion of the second kind in the definitions cited ‑ that is that the argument should create certainty ‑ is due to the fact that cer­tainty is different from presumption and the word `presumption' does not include it. As to the exclusion of the third ‑ in which an argument does not produce either presumption or certainty ‑ the reason is that the argument may not create presumption. For instance, if the validity(hujjiyyah) of al‑shuhrat al‑fatwa’iyyah or khabar al‑wahid oral‑'ijma` al‑manqul is presupposed in such a way that despite not causing presumption they should still be regarded as hujjah, then, according to this hypothesis, the derivation of ahkam of the Shari'ah by means of al­-shuhrat al‑fatwa’iyyah, khabar al‑wahid andal‑ijma'al‑manqul would not be ijtihad ‑ since we have supposed that they do not create presumption ‑ and in the light of the said definitionsijtihad means attain­ment of presumption.

If, in the above‑mentioned definitions, should `presumption' be taken to include both trustworthy and untrustworthy presumptions ‑ as it obviously does ‑ the definition will include untrustworthy presump­tion also, while the attainment of presumption regarding a hukm of the Shari’ah by means of untrustworthy presumptions is not considered asijtihad; because, it is certain that unreliable presumption cannot be a source of legislation. Accordingly, the definitions cited fail to exclude alien elements.

In addition they suffer from another fault ‑ especially those defi­nitions which mention the faqih ‑ as they fail to avoid a vicious circle.

In the definitions cited, the definition of `ijtihad' rests upon the definition of `faqih' and vice versa, for `faqih', in the technical sense, cannot be imagined without the technical qualification defined as`ijtihad', and all scholars and thinkers unanimously agree on the invalid­ity of the vicious circle.

Regarding this vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq al‑Qummi writes: The faqih is a scholar who knows the Divine ahkam through the means of reliable(mu'tabar) proofs (adillah) and sources (manabi`). This ability does not materialize without ijtihad, and without it no faqih can exist. Accordingly, the definition of `faqih' rests upon defining ijtihad, and vice versa.

Regarding the solution of the problem of the vicious circle, cer­tain Usulis have said: "According to these definitions, faqih is a person who is acquainted with and is well‑versed in fiqh; as opposed to one who has no knowledge of fiqh whatsoever. It does not mean someone who has the knowledge of all the ahkam. It is clear that in this sense the meaning of `faqih' does not rest on that of ijtihad; this avoids the vici­ous circle, because whereas the definition of ijtihad is dependent upon that of `faqih', the definition of `faqih' is not dependent upon that ofijtihad ."

But al‑Muhaqqiq. al‑Qummi objects to this statement and says: Firstly, such a sense imputed to `faqih' is figurative', as it literally means one who knows all the ahkam, not one who knows only a few of them or some of those things that are related to the ahkam. Secondly, the effort made by one who is a `faqih' in this sense does not give rise to the quality of ijtihad; for, one who knows the outlines of the issues ofijtihad and has read a few books on argumentative fiqh but lacks the faculty that enables him to revert the furu to the usul, would not be considered a faqih.

Then, in an effort to remove the vicious circle, al‑Muhaqqiq al­ Qummi says: The `faqih' is a person possessing such capacity as would lead to the knowledge of far`i ahkam of the Shari'ah. Thus, the defini­tion ofijtihad is made dependent on that of the faqih, whereas the vice versa is not essential. For, the knowledge of the ahkam of the Shari'ah exists in a faqih as a (potential) capability, and in ijtihad it exists as an actuality.

This view of the Muhaqqiq is objectionable, since faqih as a term is applied to one who actually knows the far'i ahkam of the Shari'ah through a command of its sources, not one who possesses merely the faculty and capacity of doing so; as mere capacity and faculty do not qualify one for this appallation, though the appallation of `mujtahid'may fit him. Therefore, the vicious circle still remains; as it is quite clear that the definition of `faqih' in the above sense is dependent upon that of `ijtihad', and vice versa.

Moreover, the apparent meaning of this definition is unacceptable not only in the Shi’i view of ijtihad but is also incomplete and objection­able according to the Sunni viewpoint; because legal grounds (adillah Shar’iyyah) are not confined to presumption and conjecture alone according to Sunnis and include other things besides.

In any case, the definitions cited are too restrictive in some re­spects, and in some others they do not exclude what is alien to ijtihad. Such definitions are not sound according to the science of logic, and it may be concluded that they are unacceptable to both the Muslim sects. Many a time such incorrect definitions of ijtihad have been responsible for giving rise to negative views about ijtihad, and made persons like Mirza Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi, the founder of the Akhbari school, to negate ijtihad outrightly. As a consequence of it ijtihad had been declared as one of the innovations (bid`at) and impermissible activities (this will be discussed in detail while dealing with the Akhbari revolt against ijtihad).

In fact, if ijtihad means exactly what it has been described to be in the definitions, its rejection is justified: for, to claim something as a hukm of the Shari'ah on the basis of presumptive and unreliable grounds (dala'il)and to act according to them is not permissible in Islamic law. Verses of the Quran expressly forbid reliance on presumption and con­jecture. God Almighty has stated in the Quran:


O ye who believe, shun much suspicion (al‑zann) .... (49:12)

In another place He says:


Most of them follow naught but conjecture. Assuredly conjecture can by no means take the place of the truth ....(10:36)

For positing a hukm of the Shari'ah only certainty, or such argument or methods as have been validated by the Shari'ah, may be relied upon. Such trustworthy grounds as khabar al‑wahid and the Practical Principles (al‑'usul al‑`amaliyyah) of the Shari'ah (Bara'ah, Ihtiyat,etc), though they do not lead to certainty as to the real hukm (al‑hukm al‑waqi’i) ‑ for they may be suspect regarding their chain of transmission, or meaning, or authenticity of source ‑ but the certainty of their validity and reliability justifies reliance upon them and action in accordance with them and provides security from Divine chastisement.

Anyhow, the Usulis do not conceive ijtihad in the above sense. Byijtihad' they mean the knowledge of the ahkam of the Shari'ah from sources and grounds whose validity has been affirmed by the Shari'ah, and it is by using such sources, principles and dicta that the mujtahid isable to meet the needs of contingent issues and events of life.

Accordingly, the result of ijtihad in the context of deduction of ahkamof the Shari'ah is to refer new furu` to the fundamental usul (which are the general precepts of the Book and the Sunnah) and to apply the usul to their corresponding instances. It is by means of ijtihad that sufficient evidence or hujjah regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah is secured for answers to emergent and contingent issues. Ijtihad is not meant for providing presumption or conjecture. It is this sound meaning of ijtihadthat the Usulis have accepted, and who­soever has faith in Islam and believes in its eternal and immortal character is bound to accept it in accordance with the precepts of the Shari'ah and the dictates of reason. Because, it is not possible to posit the ahkam of the Shari`ah for issues for which there is no specific express test without sufficient evidence and valid grounds, and this is a conception which Muhammad Amin al‑'Astarabadi also accepts.

It is by means of such ijtihad that valid grounds and basic and generalahkam are employed for deriving a hukm of the Shari'ah on a contingent issue. Such ijtihad is approved by the Akhbaris too, though they do not call it ijtihad'.

Thus, the incorrect conception of ijtihad ‑ i.e., the attainment of presumption on a hukm of the Shari'ah ‑ which incited the Akhbari opposition, is one which the Usuli also do not accept and one which they have never approved of. The `presumption' which al‑`Allamah al-­Hilli, the author of Ma`alim al‑'asul, and some other Shi`i scholars mention in their definitions of ijtihad, is not presumption in its generalsense, but one which is trustworthy and supported by some specificdalil..

Therefore, it does not include such presumption as is not supported by a dalil; for such presumption has been forbidden by verses of the Quran and ahadith. Hence, it cannot be said that the `presumption' mentioned in the definitions includes this (untrustworthy) kind of presumption. Accordingly, the ijtihad approved by the Usulis means procurement of sufficient evidence (hujjah) regarding a hukm of the Shari'ah ‑ a conception which the Akhbaris also do not reject.

On this basis, it can be said that the dispute between the Usulis and the Akhbaris is merely a verbal one, not one which is essential or substantial, for both of them approve of securing sufficient evidence for a hukm shar’i, with the difference that the Usulis call it ijtihad whereas the Akhbaris do not name it so.

In reality, the only objection that theAkhbaris raise regarding ijtihadrelates to the definition of ijtihad and not to the Usulis or themujtahidun as such; for the Akhbaris themselves never act on presump­tion unless it is validated by a reliable Shar'i proof (dalil).

Thus, if the word `presumption' (zann) is replaced with the term hujjah(evidence) in the said definition and it is said: "Ijtihad means employment of one's powers to secure sufficient evidence (hujjah) in regard to a hukm of the Shari'ah", there is no doubt that this controversy can be completely avoided and a synthesis of the views of the Akhbaris and the Usulis can be achieved.


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