Friday, February 7, 2014

The Doctrine of Ijma Is there a consensus


Modern perspectives on ijma
The emergence of madhabs (schools of jurisprudence) followed by the recognition of a few of these constituting orthodoxy represents a systematization of both the methodology and corpus of laws, codes and dogmas. The doctrine of ijma played a vital role in this process. Diversity of thought and room for disagreement can represent dynamism in certain respects. However, it was deemed desirable that broad agreement or near-consensus should crystallize in each madhab concerning various aspects of worship and rituals. Clearly, this does not mean that issues concerning whether tarawih prayer corresponds to 8 or 20 units, or whether amin should be said aloud in congregational prayer, have been resolved across the madhabs even over the course of fifteen centuries. Also, while the systematization of laws and codes have had an integrative effect, it has also contributed toward rigidity and even intolerance at the inter-madhab level. For example, although according to the Hanafis, a marriage between a Hanafi male and a Shafi’i female is valid according to the Shafi’i school it is invalid.[71] While ijma has been pivotal in enhancing integrative effects at the madhab level, with regards matters of rituals and worship the corpus of Islamic laws and codes have become asynchronous not just with the contemporary era, but also with the very principles and values of Islam that such laws and codes are supposed to uphold.
That Muslims are not duty bound to be permanently bound to former ijma is not a new or modern position. "This principle has been propounded by the famous Hanafi jurist Abu al-Husr al-Bazdawi in his book Usul al-Fiqh [Principles of Jurisprudence]. Al-Bazdawi belongs to the fourth and fifth century of the Hijrah. This work is a great contribution to Islamic jurisprudence. It is on account of his statement that we can say that consensus cannot become a source of difficulty for us. If a consensus is reached on some issue and it is found subsequently to be unsuitable the possibility remains that we may change it through reasoning and create a new one canceling the old consensus."[72]
Over recent centuries the classical definition and treatment of ijma has been either rejected or challenged almost consistently, with an effort to bring the doctrine into conformity with the realities of the modern age and in accordance with the spirit and vision of Islam. Muslim scholars and the intelligentsia in recent times have not discarded the concept of ijma, but have instead sought to reinstitute it in a practicable way. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1315 AH) "believed that ijma was confused with custom by the masses who were following custom in the name of ijma."[73] He recognized the validity of ijma if appropriately supported by textual evidence. However, he also held that:
 "the doctrine of ijma was a progressive concept. It should march with the time to solve fresh problems. Hence sometimes he invalidated even the ijma of the Companions on a certain point contending that a fresh ijma should be substituted for it in view of the change circumstances."[74]
Muhsin al-Mulk (d. 1325 AH) and Ubayd Allah Sindhi (d. 1363 AH) are among those who have tried to redefine or reinterpret ijma.[75] Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1357 AH) is among those who have taken the modern discourse on ijma to a new height.[76]
“The revision of Islamic jurisprudence in the light of modern situation prevailing in the Muslim world is the principal aim of Iqbal. He thinks a deeper study of Islamic law will frustrate the advocates of the view that Islamic law is stationary. The classical Fiqh of Islam requires critical discussion, though this will offend most of the orthodox Muslims. Fiqh should be changed in view of the change of circumstances. The founders of Fiqh never claimed finality of their views. The fundamental legal principles are to be interpreted in the light of the experience of modern Muslim generation. ... He believes that the transfer of power of ijtihad to a Muslim legislative assembly is the only possible form of ijma in modern times. This will also secure contribution from laymen who possess insight into affairs.”[77]
Among others of the reformist trend was Muhammad Abduh (d. 1323 AH), former Rector of al-Azhar in Egypt. He also rejected the commonly quoted hadiths forming the basis for determining the authoritative position of ijma in Islamic jurisprudence.[78] He regarded the classical definition of ijma as erroneous and impracticable, stating that:
"ijma means the consensus of the whole Muslim community in a particular generation."[79]
He also emphasized the term Ulil amr (those in authority), suggesting that it was the men in authority who should be elected by the people from the community themselves.[80] Al-Sanhuri too emphasized the importance and relevance of ijma for the development of a "representative government.”[81]
One of the primary impetuses behind challenging and reinterpreting the doctrine of ijma in the reformist line is the fact that:
“Ijma played a vital role in closing the gate of ijtihad. The agreed decisions of the second and third centuries were irrevocable. Ijtihad was exercised on points not yet settled by ijma. This continued in every generation; the scholars of subsequent generations commented on or explained the decisions of the early generations. Henceforth the gate of ijtihad was closed, though some scholars at various times claimed to be mujtahid. There is a certain analogy between the decisions taken on the basis of ijma and those taken by the councils of Christian church. Ijma in Islam became the touchstone of heresy.”[82]
Ziauddin Sardar explains how the inclusive and participatory dimension of ijma was lost and it became a tool for intolerance and exclusivism.
“... the idea of ijma, the central notion of communal life in Islam, has been reduced to the consensus of a select few. Ijma literally means consensus of the people. The concept dates back to the practice of Prophet Muhammad himself as leader of the original polity of Muslims. When the Prophet Muhammad wanted to reach a decision, he would call the whole Muslim community – then, admittedly not very large – to the mosque. A discussion would ensue; arguments for and against would be presented. Finally, the entire gathering would reach a consensus. Thus, a democratic spirit was central to communal and political life in early Islam. But over time the clerics and religious scholars have removed the people from the equation – and reduced ijma to ‘the consensus of the religious scholars’. Not surprisingly, authoritarianism, theocracy and despotism reigns supreme in the Muslim world. The political domain finds its model in what has become the accepted practice and metier of the authoritatively ‘religious’ adepts, those who claim the monopoly of exposition of Islam. Obscurantist Mullahs, in the guise of the 'ulama, dominate Muslim societies and circumscribe them with fanaticism and absurdly reductive logic.”[83]
The reformist tendency in regard to ijma and other aspects of Islamic jurisprudence is aptly summed up by AbdulHamid AbuSulayman:
“The traditionalists consider ijma the consensus of all Mujtahidin, which in the contemporary world boils down to the consensus of the authoritative 'ulama'. This view is no longer satisfactory. The ulama no longer necessarily represent the mainstream of Muslim intellectual and public involvement. Their system of education does not reflect the changes that are occurring in the world today. Their opinions therefore often only add to the already existing confusion.
It is clear that the simple, traditional concept of ijma is no longer suitable for a non-classical social system. Law and policymaking, especially in the field of international relations, involve complex techniques and considerations that are not susceptible to the old application of ijma.
It is also clear that ijma on different subjects now requires the consensus of other segments of society. The application of ijma can no longer be the exclusive prerogative of the professional Ulama. Moreover, in a rapidly changing world, the concept of permanent ijma, particularly as regards the fluid area of international relations, is neither practical nor possible because of the space-time factor.”[84]

Conclusion
Ijma has been presented as a source constituting final authority in orthodox Islamic jurisprudence. Unfortunately, as discussed here, there are serious problems concerning the functional use of this source. There is also no agreed upon textual basis for the doctrine in question. Although ijma appears to have some redeeming features, this very much depends on whether it can be made to regain its dynamism (in terms of the prerogative of every generation to reach its own consensus) and to redefine its consultative-participatory role (in terms of involvement of the pertinent scholars/experts or the entire community through elected bodies).[85]
“Ijma is not a matter of consensus of a number of experts or jurists. Its meaning and function should be worked out in relation to the legislative function in concrete political systems, where it may produce a workable relationship between the ideal and the real with maximum possible support and participation on the part of Muslim peoples.”[86]
The goal of this work is not to assert that ijma has not played some vital role in the history of Islam. or that it does not have any validity or relevance at all. Rather, it is to help drive home the point that Muslims neither need nor should claim divine sanctity for a concept that simply does not possess such agreed upon sanctity. Furthermore, as explained here, there is hardly anything, except concerning a few broad and basic matters, on which there is ijma or consensus. Thus, Muslims need to be circumspect in accepting any claim about the validity of having an ijma on something. 
Acknowledging that cases where ijma al-sahaba operate are rare and that even the claims of such ijma are contested, if there is a legitimate ijma al-sahaba on an issue it needs to be accorded the highest regard. However, the highest regard does not mean that any such claimed ijma is binding forever. Similarly, ijma of the scholars, jurists and experts carries special weight in certain respects and must be accorded as such. As long as ijma is not approached from the perspective of infallibility, rather that it is approached from the viewpoint of functionality, all such definitions of ijma can be valid and relevant.
The scope of this article has been limited to accommodate an exploration of how to ensure that ijma is relevant and functional to any contemporary time. While there are serious gaps in the doctrine of ijma, it is undeniable that there has to be some integrative mechanisms, tools and institutions to bring functional and working agreement and harmony among Muslims. In this regard, ijma as a classical Islamic doctrine may not be tenable, but the concept definitely has relevance as a method and institution, which Muslims must find ways to make practicable. Thus, conscientious Muslims need to rededicate themselves to practicing Islam and living their lives according to a dynamic, problem-solving way, instead of blindly adhering to rigid dogma or self-indulgent legalism.
Consensus




* The author expresses his thanks to Dr. Steve Connolly from the University of Teesside, UK for useful discussions and his careful editing of this article.
[1] Mohammad Hashim Kamali. Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence [Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 2003], pp. 229-230.
[2] AbdulHamid A. AbuSulayman. The Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Islamic Methodology and Thought [Herndon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987], pp. 58-59.
[3] Al-Shafi'i. Al-Shafi'i's Risala: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence [translated by Majid Khadduri; Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society, 2nd Edition, 1987], p. 78.
[4] Ahmad Hasan. The Doctrine of Ijma': A Study of the Juridical Principle of Consensus [New Delhi, India: Kitab Bhaban, 2003. See Introduction.
[5] Kamali, op. cit., p. 228.
[6] Ibid, p. 231.
[7] Ibid, p. 232.
[8] Hasan, op. cit., p. 36.
[9] Ibid, p. 36.
[10] Ibid, p. 36.
[11] Ibid, p. 36.
[12] Hasan, op. cit., pp. 149-150.
[13] Sharh Zarqani, Vol. 3, p. 167 alislam.co.za.
[14] “Regarding Tarawih,” http://mac.abc.se/~onesr/h/91.html
[15] Shahid Hasan Siddiqui. Islamic Banking: Genesis & Rationale, Evaluation & Review, Prospects & Challenges [Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1994], p. 15. [All emphases are by this author, unless indicated otherwise and appear as italicised passages.]

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