Monday, November 18, 2013

The Doctrine of Ijma Is there a consensus

The Doctrine of Ijma:
Is there a consensus





Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq
Associate Professor of Economics and Finance
Upper Iowa University





June 2006
[Draft: Feedback welcome]


Ijma or consensus is one of the four sources of Islamic jurisprudence.
Ijma is the verbal noun of the Arabic word ajma’a, which as two meanings: to determine and to agree upon something. To give an example of the former, the expression ajma’a fulan ‘ala kadha, means that ‘so-and-so decided upon such-and-such’. This usage of ajma’a is found both in the Qur’an and in the hadith. The other meaning of ajma’a is ‘unanimous agreement’. hence the phrase ajma’a al-qawm ‘ala kadha means ‘the people reached a unanimous agreement on such-and-such’. The second meaning of ijma often subsumes the first, in that whenever there is a unanimous agreement on something, there is also a decision on that matter.”[1]
The Qur'an and the Sunnah are two primary and foundational sources, while ijma and qiyas (analogical reasoning) are two secondary sources. 
“Classical Muslim methodology (usul) refers to the basic textual sources and methods used in producing Muslim attitudes in different spheres of life including international relations. These sources are the Qur'an, Sunnah, ijma (consensus), and ijtihad (the use of human reason or aql) in elaboration and interpretation of the Shari'ah. Ijtihad includes the fourth major source of Muslim thought, the qiyas (analogy) ...”[2]
"... no one at all should [give an opinion] on a specific matter by merely saying: It is permitted or prohibited, unless he is certain of [legal] knowledge, and this knowledge must be based on the Qur'an and the sunna, or [derived] from ijma (consensus) and qiyas (analogy)."[3]
From dogma to norms to laws/codes, ijma is recognized to have a pivotal place in Islamic discourse and socio-religious unity. 
"This important doctrine played a vital role in the integration of the Muslim community. In its early phase it manifested itself as a general average opinion, a common feeling of the community, and as a binding force of the body of law against unsuccessful and stray opinions. In the classical period it developed with its complex theory and ramifications. It became a decisive authority in religious affairs. All religious doctrines were standardized through ijma. Its rejection was considered heresy, indeed sometimes tantamount to unbelief."[4]
"It must be noted ... that unlike the Qur'an and Sunnah, ijma does not directly partake of divine revelation. As a doctrine and proof of Shari'ah, ijma is basically a rational proof. The theory of ijma is also clear on the point that it is a binding proof."[5]
"Ijma plays a crucial role in the development of Shari'a. The existing body of fiqh is the product of a long process of ijtihad and ijma."[6]
“Only ijma can put an end to doubt, and when it throws its weight behind a ruling, this becomes decisive and infallible. Ijma has primarily been regarded as the instrument of conservatism and of preserving the heritage of the past. ... Ijma enhances the authority of rules that are of speculative origin. Speculative rules do not carry a binding force, but once an ijma is held in their favor, they become definitive and binding. ... Lastly, ijma represent authority. Once an ijma is established it tends to become an authority in its own right, and its roots in the primary sources are gradually weakened or even lost.”[7]
Interestingly, despite the well-established position of ijma in Islamic jurisprudence, common Muslims generally are unfamiliar with the reality that ijma as an authority or source of Islamic jurisprudence stands on rather thin ice. While ijma has played to an extent an integrative role in Islamic legal discourse, it has also contributed to some entrenched divisiveness. But even more importantly is the existence of abuses of ijma, in terms of it being used as a frequently cited tool to quieten opponents. Abuse has occurred through the frequent claim of ijma applying to something, where no ijma is apparent. This issue is vital, because orthodox opinion considers that if there is an ijma on something, whether referring to dogma or legal issues, it is binding upon the Muslims.
Those who are not familiar with ijma as a concept or dogma might wonder why an unambiguous definition of the term has not been alluded to from the start; there is a valid reason for this – the reader might be surprised (even shocked) to learn that there is no consensus (ijma) even about the definition of ijma. In this essay, the notion of ijma is discussed in sufficient detail to introduce the common Muslims so that they are familiar with the uses and abuses of this otherwise valid tool of Islamic jurisprudence. It also aims to provide ample illustration and assist in the recognition and appreciation of the fact that there is still room for utilizing ijma, if the prevalent problems and limitations are dealt with and are appropriately adapted to ensure its relevancy in the contemporary time.

Orthodox emphasis on ijma
This segment draws extensively from Ahmad Hasan's comprehensive work, where all the references are fully annotated. From the sources indicated the following have been stated about ijma.
Al-Baydawi (d. 482 A.H.), a Hanafi scholar:
"One who rejects the doctrine of ijma rejects the religion at large. This is because the orbit of all the fundamentals of religion and their returning point is the ijma of Muslims."[8]
Al-Sarakhsi (d. 490 A.H), another Hanafi scholar:
"One who denies the validity of ijma seeks to indirectly demolish religion per se."[9]
Abd al-Malik al-Juwayni (d. 478 A.H.), a Shafi'i scholar:
"Ijma is the strap and support of the Shari'ah and to it the Shari'ah owes its authenticity."[10]
Al-Qarafi (d. 684 A.H.), a Maliki jurist:
"Ijma is anterior in respect of decisiveness to the other three sources of law, namely the Qur'an, Sunnah and Qiyas."[11]
Notably, al-Juwayni stakes Shari'ah's authenticity not on the Qur'an, Sunnah or qiyas, but on ijma. Al-Qarafi has gone even much further. In terms of decisiveness, he regarded ijma as holding a position higher than that of the Qur'an, Sunnah and qiyas.
“Some jurists have exaggerated the value of ijma so much so that they consider it prior to the Qur'an and Sunnah. In favour of this view it is argued that both the Qur'an and Sunnah are liable to abrogation and interpretation. But ijma is infallible and decisive. There is no room for doubt if a rule is supported by ijma. It is also prior to qiyas (analogy) because the latter is sometimes liable to fallacy.  It is worthy of remark that the ijma which is considered prior to the Qur'an and Sunnah is the kind which is decisive (qat'i), verbal (lafzi), visible or tangible (mushahad), or reported by tawatur. As regards speculative ijma, the Qur'an and Sunnah are prior to it. Supporting this viewpoint al-Isfahani remarks that ijma is superior to all sources of law (adillah) and no authority can be basically compared with it. He ascribed this view to a large number of scholars.”[12]

The claim of ijma is all too common
By way of illustration a miscellaneous list of assertions about ijma is presented below to demonstrate how common it is to claim that something constitutes ijma. Interestingly, contrary to their claims, hardly any in the list represent a consensus at all: unwarranted affirmations of ijma constitute misrepresentation of the term.
Three talaq at one sitting is valid
"The occurrence of three Talaaqs is the mazhab of the Jumhoor (majority) and on this is ijma of the ummat and whosoever opposes this will not be considered in any way."[13]
Taraweeh is 20 rak'ah
Imam Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi (d. 620), the leading Imam of the Hanbali school of thought in his time has declared in his fiqh book: al-Mughni 1/803: "There has been the Companion's consensus (ijma us-Sahabah) on 20 rak'ahs of Taraweeh."[14]
Interest is prohibited
"All the schools of thought of Muslim jurisprudence hold the unanimous view that riba, usury and interest are strictly prohibited."[15]
Intentionally missed prayer must be made up
“There is consensus (ijma) of the scholars whose opinion counts that whoever leaves a prayer intentionally must make it up."[16]
Women's leadership is prohibited
There is "ijma" (consensus of opinion) among the ummah that female leadership is not permissible. Ijma is the third most important source of Islamic law and cannot be opposed.[17]
Prophet's burial ground is the most holy place
According to the consensus (ijma) of all the scholars, the piece of land on which rests the blessed body of the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and give him peace) is more virtuous than anything and everything which includes the Ka’ba and the throne (arsh) of Allah Most High.[18]
Talfiq (mixing of opinions of different madhabs) is invalid
Among the things to note is that the fuqaha' have said that talfiq (piecing together the opinions of more than one mujtahid in one action) is invalid by scholarly consensus (ijma). This is transmitted by Ibn Abidin, and Qasim ibn Qutlubugha of the Hanafis, and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami of the Shafi`is.[19]
Tahiyyatul Masjid prayer is a sunna
"It is mentioned in al-Halba [of Ibn Amir Hajj al-Halabi]: Scholarly consensus (ijma) has been mentioned about the prayer of greeting the mosque being a sunna"[20]
Wiping over socks during travel is allowed
An-Nawawi states, "All those who qualify for ijma (consensus) agree that it is allowed to wipe over the socks--during travelling or at home, if needed or not--even a woman who stays at home or a handicapped person who cannot walk can do so.”[21]
Slaughtering without Allah's name mentioned is not lawful
The great Hanafi jurist, Allamah Ibn Abidin (Allah have mercy on him) explains the above by stating: “Meaning a slaughtered animal will not be lawful to consume (halal) if the name of Allah was intentionally not pronounced whether the slaughterer was a Muslim or from the people of the book (kitabi), because of the (clear) text of the Qur’an and the consensus (ijma) of all the scholars.”[22]
Marrying women beyond Ahl al-Kitab is not acceptable
"All Muslim jurists are unanimous (ijma) that the Qur’an’s permission to Muslims to marry the women of the People of the Book (Ahl al-Kitab) is applicable to Jewish and Christian women only and it cannot be extended to any other group."[23]
Hadrat Abu Bakr's election
”In the Hanbali view the only real Ijma which occurred other than agreement on religious belief was when the infant Muslim community elected Abu Bakr as the first Caliph following the death of the Holy Prophet.”[24]
Imam Abu Hanifah was misguided
"Muhammad bin Abdullah al Maliki said I heard Abu Bakr Subjistani telling his followers that 'What do you say when to a Fatwa on which Imam Malik, Shaafi, Imam Auzai, Hasan bin Saleh, Safyan Suhri and their respective followers have an ijma? They [his followers] said that it must be the most correct ruling. Abu Bakr Subjistani then said that these individuals have an ijma that Abu Hanifa is evil and misguided."[25]
Ijma against Imam Ibn Taymiya
Ibn Taymiyah was put in jail by the agreement of the Muslim scholars of Egypt and
ash-Sham. His imprisonment came as a result of the ijma of the scholars of his age.[26]
The Isra (mi'raj) was in body and soul
There is scholarly consensus (ijma) that Prophet Muhammad journeyed in body and soul the night of al-Isra' from Masjid al-Haram in Makkah to Masjid al-Aqsain Jerusalem. Moreover, these scholars indicated the person who denies al-Isra' is a blasphemer for belying the explicit text of the Qur'an.[27] 
Kissing the thumbs during the azan
As Sayyid 'Alawi al-Maliki (may Allah be pleased with him!) reported in his dedicated treatise on the rules concerning the use of weak Hadiths, the Manhal Latif, that scholars of the four law-schools [madhhab] concurred by ijma [Consensus]--and that this ijma was recorded from the time of the Mujtahid Imam, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (may Allah be well pleased with him!) until now--that any Hadith which are Da'if (as long as it is not Mawdu'), can be acted upon for the Fada'il al-A'mal. [28]
In dire situations, killing and eating other human beings
”In his magisterial Majmu', Nawawi sometimes, but by no means frequently, explains the reasoning involved in tashih. Consider the following examples, the first of which pertains to the types of otherwise impermissible food that a Muslim can eat should he find himself, say, in a desert where lawful food is not to be had:
Our associates held that the impermissible foods which a person finds himself compelled to eat are of two types: intoxicating and non-intoxicating. ... As for the non-intoxicant type, all foods are permitted for consumption as long as these do not involve the destruction of things protected under the law (itlaf ma'sum). He who finds himself compelled to eat is permitted to consume carrion, blood, swine meat, urine, and other impure substances. There is no juristic disagreement (khilaf) as to whether he is permitted to kill fighters against Islam and apostates and to eat them. There are two wajh-opinions** [though] concerning the married fornicator [zani muhsan],** rebels and those who refuse to pray (tarik al-salat). The more correct of the two opinions (asahh) is that he is permitted [to kill and eat them]. Imam al-Haramayn, the author [Shirazi],** and the majority of jurists (jumhur) conclusively affirm the rule of permissibility. [In justification of permissibility] Imam al-Haramayn maintained that this is because the prohibition [imposed on individual Muslims] to kill these is due to the power delegated to governing authority [tafwidan ila al-sultan), so that the exercise of this power is not preempted. When a dire need to eat arises, then this prohibition ceases to hold."[29]
At this juncture it is important to comment on Nawawi’s scarcely believable opinion: it is amazing that the Muslim jurists not only deliberated on the permissibility of eating other human beings under certain circumstances, but that they resolved the action - without any juristic disagreements whatever among themselves – to be permissible. If the permissibility is based on the sanctity of life, so that if life is at stake the general prohibitions about impermissible foods are suspended, then, conversely, one would presume that the same principle of sanctity and fundamental dignity of human life would also apply to those about to be eaten, and that human beings cannot therefore constitute one of the items permitted as foods. From this perspective it is indeed difficult to reconcile with the position of conditional cannibalism, despite the claim of the lack of any juristic disagreement by the eminent Muslim scholar concerned. Furthermore, the evidence that justifies the position – singling out the fighters against Islam, or those Muslims who refuse to pray or those who married fornicators – lacks specific permissibility from the primary and secondary sources – the Qur'an and Sunnah, respectively. This type of opinion demonstrates precisely how Islamic laws and codes have been overstretched such that fundamental values whether from an Islamic or a human viewpoint are ignored. It also appears that the jurist did not consider how the non-Muslims might reciprocate against Muslims – under which circumstances would the killing and eating of Muslims be permissible for non-Muslims. Moreover, what people might do in dire circumstances cannot be accurately predicted and codified. If some people actually faced a situation of this nature and sought an opinion from the jurists this would be one thing. However, if the opinion was merely the product of speculative, juristic argument over imaginary situations then this is unacceptable (contradicting the juristic principle that states verdicts should be confined to real as opposed to speculative situations). In essence, a juristic position of this nature violates the fundamental human dignity upheld by the Qur'an. Killing another human being to eat to save one’s own life even in dire need cannot be considered to lie within the acceptable domain of human considerations. To kill another human being in order to eat to save a life is clearly a perversion of justice, morality and basic human decency. In this situation, the sacrifice of one’s own life for others – sinners, persons not of the Muslim faith or enemies – is the correct action. Overall then, evidence for a consensus of juristic agreement on this issue is sorely lacking, as adduced from the writings of other scholars: "If a body of persons dies of hunger, it is not lawful for them to eat the flesh of anyone of them to save their lives, for the maslahah (i.e. public interest) is partial and not total."[30]
While not all the quotes above originate from scholarly sources, the common application of ijma is all too apparent. Sadly, the cited passages illustrate the tendency for ijma to be abused nearly as much as it is used since in most cases a consensus does not, in fact, exist. In many cases, , people possess an impression based on erroneous, unwarranted or false claims. Imam Ibn Taymiya [d. 1328 AH] warned of this.
Ijma means that all the Ulama of the Ummah has agreed upon a certain point. And when it is established on a certain legal point, then it is not rightful for any person to refuse to accept that. This is so because the entire Ummah cannot have consensus on error. But there are many problems about which people think that there is ijma on them, while in fact there is none. Rather in some cases even the opposite view is correct and is upheld.[31]
It has been a common practice among Muslim scholars and jurisprudents to claim consensus (ijma) about almost anything they have given their juristic opinion on. The very use of the word ijma inspires awe among the pious. However, the reality is that ijma is a rare occurrence; some might argue that more often than not it is nothing but a mirage. As AbdulHamid AbuSulayman, former rector of the International Islamic University, Malaysia, points out except in a few basic matters, there is hardly any consensus at all.
Ijma ... is meant to be applied in cases where there is no nass (text) from the Qur'an or the Sunnah to decide the hukm (rule). ... The only agreement among jurists based on 'ijma concerns the prayers being five times a day, the obligation of zakah, etcetera. These subjects, however, are backed by the Qur'an and Sunnah and the ijma of the companions of the Prophet (PBUH); they are, in fact, common knowledge. Beyond these fundamentals, no absolute consensus has been reached on any issue. There is continued controversy in the different schools of jurisprudence.”[32]
“The gap between the theory and practice of ijma is reflected in the difficulty that many jurists have acknowledged to exist in implementing its theoretical requirements. The absolute terms of the classical definition of ijma have hardly been fulfilled by conclusive factual evidence that would eliminate all levels of ikhtilaf. ijma has often been claimed for rulings on which only a majority consensus had existed within or beyond a particular school. The proof and authenticity of ijma has, on the other hand, not received the kind of attention that has been given to the authentication of hadith through a reliable isnad.”[33]
Let alone in the case of ijma, using any of the extant definitions of the term, broad agreements are also quite uncommon. To appreciate this statement, consider the case of the Hanafi school, where two disciples, Imam Muhammad and Imam Abu Yusuf, played a vital role along with Imam Abu Hanifah, the founder, in shaping the school. Going through al-Marghinani’s Hedaya,[34] one of the leading texts of Hanafi fiqh based on classical sources, it is possible to pick a topic almost at random to see how frequently even the three elders of the Hanafi school of fiqh (Imam Abu Hanifah and his two disciples) disagree on various issues covered in the book.[35]

Ijma: Definition and lack of consensus
The problem with ijma begins with the definition of the term. There is no ijma (consensus) on the definition of ijma (consensus). Careful scrutiny of the literature bears this point out.
Interestingly, the issue of the definition of ijma was not raised until the time of Imam Shafi'i (d. 204 AH). Even the 4th century scholar Abu Bakr al-Jassas (d. 370 AH) did not provide definition. By the end of 4th century attempts by various scholars to deal with the definition of ijma begin to appear. These are discussed in detail by Hasan (2003).[36]
Abul Husayn al-Basri (d. 436 AH): "Agreement of a group (jama'ah) on a certain matter of by action or abandonment."
Imam Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 AH): "Agreement of the community of Muhammad on a religious point."
Al-Amidi: (d. 1233): "Agreement of all the people of binding and loosing who belong to the community of Muhammad, in a certain period of time, on a rule about a certain incidence."
Based on the various definitions of the term, four broad aspects of an ijma can be identified. Interestingly, there is no ijma (consensus) about any of these four aspects:
·         Whose agreement constitutes ijma?
·         What competence should the constituent group minimally have? 
·         What time period does an ijma cover?
·         What subject matters fall within the scope of ijma?
At this point, it is worthwhile exploring in greater detail: Whose agreement constitutes ijma?
"According to the orthodox view, ijma is the unanimous agreement of the community or of the scholars."[37]
Notably, the orthodox view above fails to agree on whether it is the consensus of the entire community or the consensus of the scholars that is specified. According to Imam Shafi'i, an ijma is not an ijma unless it is of the entire community. In the introduction to Majid Khadduri’s translation of Shafi'i's Risala the following is mentioned: 
"By ijma (consensus) Shafi'i does not mean merely the agreement of a few scholars of a certain town or locality, as the Hijazi and Iraqi jurists seem to have held, but the majority of leading jurists in Muslim lands. He also universalized ijma on matters of fundamentals to include agreement of the Muslim community. On matters of fundamentals arrived at by consensus, Shafi'i argues, there should be no disagreement (ikhtilaf), but on matters of detail for which there may be two answers, one answer might be chosen by istihsan (discretion or preference). The earlier jurists seem to have permitted a greater degree of discretion than Shafi'i was inclined to accept."[38]
Imam Malik, Imam Ghazali, and Ibn Hazm (Zahiris) held very different opinions on the term. 
"To Malik, ijma is of the companions of the Prophet and their successors residing at Medina."[39] "Malik ... recognized the ijma of the scholars of his own locality -- Madina."[40]
"Shafi'i's doctrine of the community at large was opposed by other scholars, including his own followers, although Ghazali (d. 1111) tried to confine the agreement to fundamental principles, leaving matters of detail to the consensus of the scholars. The fundamental weakness in the doctrine of the consensus of the community was procedural--the lack of an adequate method which would provide means for the community to arrive at an agreement."[41]
"To the Zahiris, valid ijma was consensus of the Companions of the Prophet".[42]
"Ibn Jarir, al-Tabari and Abu Bakr al-Razi regard even a majority decision as ijma."[43]
And according to Ibn Taymiya:
"ijma means that all the Ulama of the Ummah has agreed upon a certain point."[44]
The Zahiris as well as Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal confine ijma to the consensus of the companions [ijma as-sahaba] alone. Interestingly, some proponents of the Khilafah (Caliphate or Islamic State) in modern times propose ijma al-sahaba as part of the constitution. In his book The System of Islam [Nizam al-Islam], Taqiuddin al-Nabhani [d. 1979 AD] includes a draft constitution for Khilafah or Islamic State.
“Article 12: The only evidences to be considered for the divine rules (ahkam shara’iah) are: the Qur'an, the Sunnah, the consensus of the Companions (ijma as-sahabah) and analogy (qiyas). Legislation cannot be taken from any source other than these evidences.”[45]
While it is generally agreed that Islamic laws are drawn from four foundational sources, which include ijma, to specify ijma as ijma al-sahaba is simply untenable as there is no consensus about the definition of ijma nor should such matters be so narrowly specified in a constitution, in exclusion to all other possible meanings or definitions. The case can be made that there are some things on which there have been ijma as-sahaba,[46] and there is also a theological or intellectual case that ijma al-sahaba is the only valid ijma, but since a constitution is a legally binding document or contract, limiting ijma to ijma as-sahaba alone and then elevating it to the level of a dogma in its narrow or restricted form is unwarranted.[47] What about all those who disagree with this position (and, indeed, the preponderance of the opinion of the scholars is such that it does not restrict valid ijma to only ijma as-sahaba)? Indeed, constitutionalizing such dogmas by a state, in the presence of such significant difference can be a dangerous proposition.
Furthermore, this view leads to hardly anything more functional and useful either. The reason being that the companions did not display a high level of consensus on a wide variety of issues so as to qualify these as ijma (ijma al-sahaba). Even though Imam Shafi'i accepts the validity of ijma, he clarifies:
"I would accept the opinion [of a Companion] if I did not find anything about it in the Book, or established sunna or consensus, or anything of similar meaning that would decisively support it, or any analogical deduction. But one seldom finds an opinion of one Companion that is not contradicted by another."[48]
 84.

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